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The Neuroscience of Qualified
Immunity
Gary S. Gildin*
ABSTRACT
Qualified immunity not only absolves public officials from
accountability for the damages caused when they deprive a citizen of their constitutional rights; by virtue of companion doctrines shielding governmental entities from liability, conferral of
immunity leaves the victim to bear the loss. Therefore, it is essential that the contours of immunity be carefully calibrated to align
with its intended purposes.
The United States Supreme Court has continuously expanded immunity to protect the exercise of discretion where, albeit acting in violation of constitutional norms, the official could
have reasonably believed their conduct was constitutional. This
Article exposes the implicit assumptions as to the operation of
the brain that underpin the evolution of the Court’s immunity
jurisprudence. It then explains how the Court’s suppositions are
refuted by recent findings in the field of neuroscience and proposes reforms that would harmonize immunity with the true
workings of the minds of government officials.
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INTRODUCTION
The nationwide protests following the latest spate of police
killings of Black citizens brought the doctrine of qualified immunity
to public consciousness. While the bulk of the reporting has focused
on the effect qualified immunity has on the accountability of law
enforcement officials, the defense is available to every person working for the government. Qualified immunity frees federal, state, and
local officials of every stripe from liability for damages caused when
they violate the fundamental rights guaranteed to citizens by the
United States Constitution. The present contours of qualified immunity have been critiqued by academics,1 judges—including members of the United States Supreme Court,2—and legislators.3 A
1. A March 4, 2022, search request for “qualified immunity” in the Current
Index to Legal Periodicals database on Hein Online yielded 450 results. The same
search request of secondary materials in the Lexis Secondary Materials database
yielded over 10,000 results, with 1,759 of those results published after January 1,
2017. Of course, not every article discredits the doctrine. See, e.g., Lawrence Rosenthal, Defending Qualified Immunity, 72 S.C. L. REV. 547 (2020). I apologize for
my inability to cite to the authors of each article who likely have made observations about qualified immunity similar to many that I will make in the run-up to
the central thesis of this article.
2. See, e.g., Hoggard v. Rhodes, 141 S. Ct. 2421, 2422 (2021) (THOMAS, J.,
concurring in the denial of certiorari) (“[I]n an appropriate case, we should reconsider either our one-size-fits-all test or the judicial doctrine of qualified immunity
more generally.”); Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1872 (2017) (THOMAS, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (“In an appropriate case, we should
reconsider our qualified immunity jurisprudence.”). In Salazar-Limon v. City of
Houston, JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR dissented from the denial of certiorari and stated:
Our failure to correct the error made by the court below . . . continues a
disturbing trend regarding the use of this Court’s resources. We have not
hesitated to summarily reverse courts for wrongly denying offices the
protection of qualified immunity in cases involving the use of force. But
we rarely intervene where courts wrongly afford officers the benefit of
qualified immunity in these same cases. The erroneous grant of summary
judgment in qualified-immunity cases imposes no less harm on ‘society as
a whole’ than does the erroneous denial of summary judgment in such
cases.
131 S. Ct. 1277, 1282 (2017) (SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting) (citations omitted); see
also Jamison v. McClendon, 476 F. Supp. 3d 386 (S.D. Miss. 2020) (Reeves, J.);
Thompson v. Clark, No. 14-CV-7349, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105225 (E.D.N.Y.
June 18, 2018) (Weinstein, J.).
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handful of states have modified or abrogated the defense in civil
actions for damages incurred by deprivations of rights protected by
state constitutions.4
This Article adds to the ongoing debate over the appropriate
boundaries of qualified immunity by drawing upon wisdom outside
conventional legal sources, methodologies, and critiques. By repeatedly adjusting the standard for qualified immunity to avoid inhibiting the decision-making of governmental agents, the Supreme
Court has relied on its own presumptions as to what influences official behavior.5 New technologies—neuroimaging, optogenetics, and
transcranial stimulation—have allowed neuroscientists to see how
3. Bills to eliminate the qualified immunity defenses were introduced in both
the House and Senate in 2020. See Ending Qualified Immunity Act, H.R. 7085,
116th Cong. (2d Sess. 2020); Ending Qualified Immunity Act, S. 4142, 116th Cong.
(2d Sess. 2020). On March 23, 2021, the United States House of Representatives
passed the broader George Floyd Justice in Policing Act of 2021, H.R. 1280, 117th
Cong. (1st Sess. 2021). Section 102 of that Act amends 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as follows:
It shall not be a defense or immunity in any action brought under this
section against a local law enforcement officer (as such term is defined in
section 2 of the George Floyd Justice in Policing Act of 2021), or in any
action under any source of law against a Federal investigative or law enforcement officer (as such term is defined in section 2680(h) of title 28,
United States Code), that—
“(1) the defendant was acting in good faith, or that the defendant believed, reasonably or otherwise, that his or her conduct was lawful at the
time when the conduct was committed; or
“(2) the rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws were not clearly established at the time of their deprivation by the
defendant, or that at such time, the state of the law was otherwise such
that the defendant could not reasonably have been expected to know
whether his or her conduct was lawful.”
Id. On March 1, 2021, the Executive Office of the President issued a Statement of
Administration Policy encouraging the passage of the Act. OFF. OF MGMT. &
BUDGET, EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATION POLICY: H.R. 1280—GEORGE FLOYD JUSTICE IN POLICING ACT OF 2021 (Mar. 1,
2021), https://bit.ly/379x0Cp [https://perma.cc/KG7W-2JSL]; see also WHITNEY K.
NOVAK, CONG. RSCH. SERV., LSB10492, Policing the Police: Qualified Immunity
and Considerations for Congress (2020) https://bit.ly/3hDDjA3 [https://perma.cc/
H3FK-3ZJX].
4. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-131(2)(b) (West 2022); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 41-4A-4 (West 2022); 2020 Conn. Acts 143 (Spec. Sess.); Baldwin v. City of
Estherville, 915 N.W. 2d 259, 266–75 (Iowa 2018). In March of 2021, the New York
City Council passed a bill that created a local right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures and excessive force, and barred police officers from invoking
qualified immunity to shield themselves from liability in a civil action seeking damages for violation of the right. N.Y.C., N.Y., Law 2021/048 (2021), https://
on.nyc.gov/3hHU5hq [https://perma.cc/CYB8-VJQ7].
5. See infra Part III; see also Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399 (1997)
(denying qualified immunity to guards employed by private prison management
firm, reasoning that private sector market forces will ensure that employees are
not unduly timid in acting).
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the neurons in the brain interact and to experiment on their operation.6 As Dr. Lisa Feldman Barrett reported in her 2017 work,7 the
findings of neuroscientists have upended centuries-old assumptions
as to the workings of both logic and emotion:
We are, I believe, in the midst of a revolution in our understanding of emotion, the mind, and the brain—a revolution that may
compel us to radically rethink such central tenets of our society
as our treatments for mental and physical illness, our understanding of personal relations, our approach to raising children, and
ultimately our view of ourselves.8

A bevy of diverse disciplines have used revelations emerging
from neuroscience and neurobiology to revisit and revise settled
understandings,9 including proposals to reform legal doctrine.10
While most of the extrapolation to law has focused on criminal culpability,11 neuroscientific findings are fertile territory for—in an objective and non-partisan way—devising a qualified immunity
standard that aligns with how the brain of a government official
asserting immunity prompts them to behave.12
6. LEONARD MLODINOW, EMOTIONAL: HOW FEELINGS SHAPE OUR THINKxiii (2022).
7. LISA FELDMAN BARRETT, HOW EMOTIONS ARE MADE (2017).
8. Id. at xv.
9. See ROBERT SAPOLSKY, BEHAVE 79 ( 2017) (“There’s been a proliferation
of ‘neuro’ fields. Some, like neuroendocrinology and neuro immunology, are
stodgy old institutions by now. Others are relatively new—neuroeconomics,
neuromarketing, neuroethics, and, I kid you not, neuroliterature and neuroexistentialism.”); MLODINOW, supra note 6, at xiii–iv (noting the application of a new field
of psychology, “affective neuroscience,” by the National Institute of Mental
Health, National Cancer Institute, Kennedy School of Government, computer
scientists, business schools, and marketing organizations).
10. See BARRETT, supra note 7, at 219–51.
11. The Fordham Law Review and the Fordham Law School Neuroscience
and Law Center cosponsored the Symposium Criminal Behavior and the Brain:
When Law and Neuroscience Collide, papers from which are published in Volume
85 of the Fordham Law Review. See, e.g., Deborah W. Denno, Criminal Behavior
and the Brain: When Law and Neuroscience Collide, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 399
(2016) (providing an overview of the symposium topic and articles). The Mercer
Law Review published articles and the transcript of proceedings from its symposium, The Brain Sciences in the Courtroom. See, e.g., Theodore Y. Blumoff, Foreword: The Brain Sciences and Criminal Law Norms, 62 MERCER L. REV. 705
(2011). The New Criminal Law Review devoted an entire volume to what it termed
The Neurolaw Issue. See, e.g., Carrie Leonetti, Editor’s Introduction, 21 NEW
CRIM. L. REV. 209 (2018).
12. Professor Kolber has posited that the significant impact of neuroscience
on law will lie outside the realm of criminal responsibility. See generally Adam J.
Kolber, Will There Be a Neurolaw Revolution?, 89 IND. L.J. 807 (2014). For an
excellent history of the intersection between neuroscience and law, see generally
Francis X. Shen, The Overlooked History of Neurolaw, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 667
(2016). Others have rightfully cautioned against uncritical reliance on extrapolaING
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Part I of the Article identifies what is at stake in the debate
over qualified immunity. Part II traces the origin and evolution of
the Supreme Court’s immunity doctrine. Part III identifies the implicit assumptions about the workings of the brain of a public official that underlie the Court’s legal test for immunity, analyzes
whether those assumptions are supported by neuroscience, and proposes modifications to the immunity doctrine to make it congruent
with the operation of the brain
I. THE STAKES
In his published conversation with legal writing expert Bryan
Garner, the late David Foster Wallace suggested how any work setting forth an argument should begin:
A good opener, first and foremost, fails to repel. Right? So it’s
interesting, and engaging. It lays out the terms of the argument,
and in my opinion, should also in some way imply the stakes.
Right? Not only am I right, but in any piece of writing there’s a
tertiary argument: Why should you spend your time reading this?
Right? “So here’s why the following issue might be important,
useful, practical.”13

To appreciate why it is well worth reading or caring about the
proper scope of qualified immunity, we must fully comprehend
what is at stake.
While securing fundamental individual liberties, the United
States Constitution does not prescribe a remedy for when the government violates its mandates.14 In response to state and local officials’ unwillingness or inability to quell the Ku Klux Klan’s violent
tion from neuroscience in crafting legal doctrine. See, e.g., David W. Opderbeck,
The Problem with Neurolaw, 58 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 497 (2014); Abigail A. Baird,
Christy L. Barrow & Molly K. Richard, Juvenile Neurolaw: When It’s Good It Is
Very Good Indeed, And When It’s Bad It’s Horrid, 15 J. HEALTH CARE L. & Pol’y
15 (2012); Stephen J. Morse, Avoiding Irrational NeuroLaw Exuberance: A Plea
for Neuromodesty, 62 Mercer L. Rev. 837 (2011); Steven K. Erickson, The Limits
of Neurolaw, 11 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 303 (2011); Daniel S. Goldberg,
Against Reductionism in Law & Neuroscience, 11 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y
321 (2011).
13. DAVID FOSTER WALLACE & BRYAN A. GARNER, QUACK THIS WAY 80
(2013).
14. The Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that
compensation should be awarded for governmental takings of private property.
U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public uses,
without just compensation.”). The Constitution also preserves the remedy of
habeas corpus. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (“The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or invasion the
public Safety may require it.”).
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obstruction of guarantees of constitutional amendments designed to
secure racial equality, the 1871 Congress enacted what is now codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1983:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of
Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in
any action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress
applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.15

Through Section 1983, Congress sought to redress two deficiencies in state law. First, even where a remedy was available
under state law, the civil cause of action Congress created provided
compensation for the “significantly different . . . and more serious”
deprivations of constitutional rights.16 Second, because state courts
had proven to be unreliable protectorates of civil liberties, Congress
authorized federal court jurisdiction over the newly-established
civil action through passage of companion legislation.17
As the title of the doctrine portends, qualified immunity frees
the government agent who has wronged a citizen in violation of the
Constitution from paying a sum in damages to the victim.18 Where
15. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 does not reach unconstitutional actions of
federal officials. In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), the Court implied a cause of action for damages
against federal agents to redress deprivations of Fourth Amendment rights. Unlike
Section 1983, the Court has not construed Bivens to afford a cause of action for all
instances of deprivation of constitutional rights. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Mesa, 140
S. Ct. 735 (2020) (refusing to extend Bivens to provide relief against Border Patrol
agents who shot plaintiff’s son across a culvert separating the United States and
Mexico because of its implications for foreign relations and national security and
hesitation of Congress to create claims for tortious conduct beyond the national
border); Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1857 (2017) (“Given the notable change
in the Court’s approach to recognizing implied causes of action . . . expanding the
Bivens remedy is now a ‘disfavored’ judicial activity.”). For purposes of this article,
the relevant takeaway is that the United States Supreme Court has held that where
Bivens actions exist, individual federal officials are sheltered by the same qualified
immunity available to state and local officials sued under Section 1983. See generally Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
16. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 196 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring).
17. 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3). Congress did not establish general federal court jurisdiction until four years after passage of § 1983 and § 1343(3). See 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
18. Immunity is available even where, as is most often the case, the government will indemnify the official. Greer v. Shoop, 141 F. 3d 824, 828 (8th Cir. 1998);
see also James E. Pfander, Alexander A. Reinert & Joanna C. Schwartz, The Myth

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\126-3\DIK303.txt

776

unknown

Seq: 8

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

5-MAY-22

9:30

[Vol. 126:769

the officer is immunized, the loss from the deprivation must be allocated either to the governmental entity that employed the officer or
to the injured citizen. While it would seem unconscionable to leave
the citizen who has suffered an invasion of their most fundamental
rights remediless,19 in most instances this is precisely the consequence of conferring qualified immunity on the individual official.
Where the wrongdoer is employed by a state entity, the citizen
will receive no compensation for their injuries.20 Under Section
Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress has the power to abrogate the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court without its consent.21 The Supreme Court has held,
however, that Congress did not intend to exert that power when it

of Personal Liability: Who Pays When Bivens Claims Succeed, 72 STAN. L. REV.
561 (2020); Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885
(2014) (documenting that the individual official rarely is personally responsible for
paying a damage judgment in civil liberties actions). The individual official may not
assert qualified immunity where the plaintiff seeks equitable relief. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 314 n.6 (1975). However, the Supreme Court’s prerequisites to
Article III standing; its general standards for equitable relief; and its belief that
considerations of federalism are heightened when plaintiffs seek injunctive relief
rather than damages greatly diminish the viability of a Section 1983 action for equitable relief against an individual official. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Lyons,
461 U.S. 95 (1983); Ashcroft v. Mattis, 431 U.S. 171 (1977); Rizzo v. Goode, 423
U.S. 362 (1976).
19. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803) (“The very essence of civil
liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of
the laws, whenever he receives an injury. One of the first duties of government is
to afford that protection.”); G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, at art. 8 (Dec. 12, 1948) (“Everyone has the right to an effective
remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental
rights granted him by the [C]onstitution or by law.”); International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights art. 2, ¶ 3, adopted Dec. 19, 1966, T.I.A.S. 92-908 (“Each
State Party to the present Covenant undertakes: To ensure that any person whose
rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall have an effective remedy
. . . .”); International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination art. 6, opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, T.I.A.S. 94-1120 (“States Parties shall
assure to everyone within their jurisdiction effective protection and remedies,
through the competent national tribunals and other State institutions, against any
acts of racial discrimination . . . as well as the right to seek from such tribunals just
and adequate reparation or satisfaction for any damage suffered . . . .”); American
Convention on Human Rights art. 25, ¶ 1, effective July 18, 1978, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123
(“Everyone has the right to simple and prompt recourse . . . for protection against
acts that violate his fundamental rights recognized by the constitution or laws of
the state concerned or by this Convention, even though such violation[s] may have
been committed by persons acting in the course of their official duties.”).
20. Sovereign immunity entirely shelters federal government entities from liability for damages in a Bivens action. FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475, 484–86
(1994).
21. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976).
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enacted Section 1983.22 Hence, whenever qualified immunity
shields the individual state official from liability, the citizen is left
without a remedy for the damages caused by the invasion of their
constitutional liberties.23
For different reasons, victims of unconstitutional action by local government officials, in most instances, will be left to bear the
risk of loss. Unlike their state counterparts, local governments are
not protected by the Eleventh Amendment against suit in federal
court.24 Furthermore, a municipality may not assert the “good faith
of its officers or agents as a defense to liability under § 1983.”25
However, departing from the treatment of municipalities at common law,26 the Supreme Court has held that a local government is
not vicariously liable for constitutional malfeasance by its employee
acting in the scope of their employment.27 Rather, the entity is liable only “when execution of a government’s policy or custom,
whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts
may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury.”28
22. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 345 (1979). The Court subsequently held
that plaintiff cannot recover damages from a state department by filing the Section
1983 action in state court—where the Eleventh Amendment is inapplicable—because Congress did not intend to include states among the “person[s]” liable under
the statute. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 68–69 (1989).
23. A plaintiff may avoid the bar of the Eleventh Amendment by suing the
state official in their official capacity, but only as long as the relief sought is prospective rather than retroactive. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 677 (1974); Ex
Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155–56 (1908). While the Court reasoned that the availability of prospective relief did not “render § 1983 meaningless insofar as States
are concerned,” Quern, 440 U.S. at 345, it has erected near-insurmountable obstacles to obtaining equitable relief to redress deprivations of constitutional rights.
See supra note 18.
24. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.54 (1976). And unlike
states, local governmental entities are “persons” suable under the text of Section
1983. Id. at n.55.
25. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 638 (1980). Some Justices
have suggested that while local governments may not invoke qualified immunity, a
local government cannot be liable for deliberate indifference to the need for training where the right violated was not clearly established. City of Canton v. Harris,
489 U.S. 378, 396 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
see Gonzalez v. Ysleta Indep. Sch. Dist., 996 F.2d 745, 759–60 (5th Cir. 1993)
(“There are some indications that Canton requires a showing of deliberate indifference to citizens’ constitutional rights, not merely the harm inflicted by city employees that gives rise to constitutional claims. It therefore may well be . . . that ‘to be
“deliberately indifferent” to rights requires that those rights be clearly established.’ ”) (citations omitted); Lewis ex rel. Cornfield v. Consol. Sch. Dist. No. 230,
991 F.2d 1316, 1327 (7th Cir. 1993) (“Given the nebulous standards governing student searches, school districts . . . cannot be held accountable on this ground [failure to train] because the particular constitutional duty is not clear.”).
26. See, e.g., Owen, 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
27. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691.
28. Id. at 694.
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Through a series of decisions interpreting the policy or custom
prerequisite to local governmental liability, the Supreme Court has
erected almost insurmountable barriers to recovery in all but the
most egregious cases.29 Where the local official is protected by
qualified immunity and the official’s actions, albeit unconstitutional, did not represent the policy or custom of the local government, the citizen is denied any compensation for the injuries they
suffered.
In sum, in most instances where the official is exonerated from
liability, the citizen will not be compensated for the injuries caused
by the invasion of their constitutional right. If qualified immunity is
to be afforded for constitutional violations, then it must be finetuned to avoid excusing behaviors of government officials that are
not contemplated or justified by the purposes of that immunity. An
informed understanding of the workings of the brain through which
government officials make their judgments is indispensable if we
are to properly prescribe the prerequisites for immunity. The Justices of the Supreme Court have speculated about what animates
the decisions of public officials who violate the Constitution. However, neuroscientists, who have literally watched and charted the
operation of the brain, are more reliable guides to achieving a standard for immunizing unconstitutional conduct that aligns with the
reality of decision-making.
II. THE ORIGIN
STANDARD

AND

EVOLUTION

OF THE

QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

To identify the hypothesized working of the brain that underlies the Supreme Court’s qualified immunity jurisprudence, it is
necessary to trace the evolution of the Court’s legal test for when
29. Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 64 (2011) (requiring “proof of a preexisting pattern of violations” by untrained employees to establish a policy of deliberate indifference in training); Bd. of the Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397,
412 (1997) (concluding that a county is liable for a policymaker’s hiring decision
only where the policymaker was deliberately indifferent to the risk that hiring the
employee would result in the violation of the particular constitutional right asserted in the Section 1983 action); Harris, 489 U.S. at 390, 390 n.10 (1989) (finding
that a city could be liable for its failure to train where a) the need for training is
“ ‘so obvious” that failure to do so amounted to “deliberate indifference,” or b)
officers “so often violate constitutional rights that the need for further training
must have been plainly obvious to the city policymakers, who, nevertheless, are
‘deliberately indifferent’ to the need.”); City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S.
112, 127–31 (1988) (finding that the single act of an official constitutes policy only
if a judge makes the finding that the official has final authority under codified state
and local law).
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an official is excused from liability for infringement of a constitutional right.
A. The Origin of Qualified Immunity
The text of Section 1983 makes no mention of immunity. To
the contrary, it prescribes that “every person” acting under color of
state law who deprives a citizen of rights secured by the United
States Constitution “shall be liable to the person injured in an action at law.”30 Consistent with the plain meaning of the statutory
text, the legislative history counsels that courts are to liberally construe Section 1983 in favor of affording relief to the citizen who
suffers injuries from the invasion of their constitutional rights.31
Notwithstanding the unqualified language of the statute, the
legislative instruction to broadly construe its terms to afford relief,
and Congress’ underlying purpose to remedy deficiencies in common law protection,32 the United States Supreme Court in Pierson
v. Ray33 held that the 1871 Congress intended to allow officials sued
under Section 1983 to assert immunities available to their office at
common law at the time that the act was passed.34 The Court reasoned that although the language of Section 1983 imposes liability
on “every person[,] . . . . [t]he legislative record gives no clear indication that Congress meant to abolish wholesale all common-law
immunities.”35
B. The Evolution of the Test for Qualified Immunity
Given its origin, we should not expect the test for qualified immunity to change. Because the immunity was founded in the 1871
Congress’ intent to incorporate then-settled common law doctrine,
the requisites to the immunity should be fixed. At the very least,
any alteration of the criteria for immunity under Section 1983
30. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
31. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 683–87.
32. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 173–74 (1961).
33. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
34. Id. at 554–55, 557. While sporadically inquiring whether the particular official sued under Section 1983 was sheltered by a common law immunity, see, e.g.,
Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914 (1984) (concluding that public defenders may not
assert qualified immunity because no immunity existed at common law for analogous counsel); Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399 (1997) (prohibiting guards
employed by a private management company from asserting immunity in a Section
1983 action because private jailers were not afforded immunity at common law),
the Supreme Court has largely abandoned that prerequisite, instead assuming that
any official not protected by absolute immunity may assert qualified immunity. See
Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 568–69 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
35. Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554.
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should be attributed to subsequent adjustment of the legal test for
immunity under the common law. Instead, the Supreme Court took
it upon itself to create a new immunity standard that: was not
grounded in any common law;36 ignored the legislative exhortation
to construe Section 1983 broadly and liberally in favor of furnishing
relief; and continually expanded the conditions under which officials could evade liability for harm caused by their unconstitutional
conduct.
1. The Original Immunity Test: Absolving Police Officers Who
Arrest in Good Faith and with Probable Cause for a
Violation of a Then-Valid State Law
The qualified immunity afforded by the Pierson Court was
available in a highly circumscribed situation; it exonerated only police officers who fully complied with constitutional limits on their
authority while enforcing a state law that was ruled unconstitutional
after the arrest.37 Pierson arose out the effort of 15 white and Black
Episcopal clergy to breach segregated facilities in the Jackson, Mississippi bus terminal.38 City of Jackson police arrested the clergymen for violating a Mississippi law that prohibited “congregat[ing]
with others in a public place under circumstances such that a breach
of peace may be occasioned thereby, and refus[ing] to move on
when ordered to do so by a police officer.”39 Four years after these
arrests, the Supreme Court held the Mississippi statute
unconstitutional.40
The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals’ ruling that
the arresting officers could assert no immunity in the Section 1983
damages action brought by the arrested clergymen.41 The Court
reasoned that, at common law, an officer was not liable for false
arrest when the defendant was acquitted, as long as the officer had
36. See Hoggard v. Rhodes, 141 S. Ct. 2421 (2021) (THOMAS, J., concurring in
the denial of certiorari) (“[W]e have ‘substitute[d] our own policy preferences for
the mandates of Congress’ by conjuring up blanket immunity and then failed to
justify our enacted policy.”); Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1871 (2017)
(THOMAS, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“Because our
analysis is no longer grounded in the common-law backdrop against which Congress enacted the 1871 Act, we are no longer engaged in ‘interpreting the intent of
Congress in enacting’ the Act.”); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 645 (1987)
(acknowledging the Court has “completely reformulated qualified immunity along
principles not at all embodied in the common law”).
37. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967).
38. Pierson, 386 U.S. at 549.
39. Id. at 548.
40. Id. at 550.
41. Id.
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probable cause to make the arrest. While finding the matter “not
entirely free from doubt,” the Court concluded that an officer similarly should be “excus[ed] . . . from [Section 1983] liability for acting
under a statute that he reasonably believed to be valid but was later
held unconstitutional.”42
The immunity the Pierson Court endorsed was limited to protecting a police officer from the Hobson’s choice of “being charged
with dereliction of duty if he does not arrest when he has probable
cause, and being mulcted in damages if he does.”43 The Court properly recognized that the Freedom Riders’ claim for relief was not
limited to asserting that the officers arrested them for disobeying an
unconstitutional state law.44 Rather, the plaintiff clergy also contended that the police officers lacked probable cause that the Freedom Riders had violated the statute, as no crowd (other than
reporters) was present at the bus terminal and their attempt to use
the “White Only” waiting room posed no threat of violence or disturbance.45 The Supreme Court instructed that on remand, the officers were entitled to immunity only if the jury found that: 1) the
police “did not arrest the [Freedom Riders] for the purpose of preserving the custom of segregation in Mississippi,” and 2) “that a
crowd gathered and that imminent violence was likely.”46 The Supreme Court offered no avenue for the police officers to avoid liability if they had acted in bad faith or had failed to comply with the
constitutional requirement of probable cause.
2. Expanding the Scope of Immunity for High-Level Executive
Officials Through a Test of Good Faith and
Reasonableness Under All the Circumstances
In Scheuer v. Rhodes”47 the Supreme Court crafted a test for
qualified immunity that extended more generous refuge from liability to upper-level officials of the executive branch. Scheuer arose
out of a Section 1983 damages action filed by the estates of Kent
State University students who were shot and killed by Ohio Na42. Id. at 555.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 557.
45. Video footage clearly confirmed that after the Freedom Riders peaceably
entered the bus terminal, police officers immediately placed them under arrest and
escorted them into paddy wagons without incident. See Eyes on the Prize: Ain’t
Scared of Your Jails (1960-1961), (PBS Apr. 11, 2021). On the trial de novo following the appeal from one of the convictions, the trial judge directed a verdict of
acquittal at the close of the prosecution’s case and the government dropped the
cases against the remaining Freedom Riders. Pierson, 386 U.S. at 549.
46. Pierson, 386 U.S. at 557.
47. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
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tional Guardsmen in May of 1970 during a protest against the war
in Vietnam. Plaintiffs alleged that the defendants—the Governor of
the State of Ohio, the Adjutant General and his assistant, officers
and enlisted members of the Ohio National Guard, and the President of Kent State University—“‘intentionally, recklessly, willfully
and wantonly’ caused an unnecessary deployment of the Ohio National Guard on the Kent State campus and . . . ordered the Guard
members to perform allegedly illegal actions.”48
The district court granted the motion to dismiss the Complaint.49 While plaintiffs had named individual officials as defendants, the trial court ruled that the action was against the State of
Ohio and therefore was barred by the Eleventh Amendment to the
United States Constitution, which deprives federal courts of jurisdiction over an action against a state without its consent.50 The
court of appeals affirmed.51 Its opinion proffered an added ground
for upholding the district court’s ruling by reasoning that the common-law doctrine of executive immunity afforded defendants absolute protection against suits under Section 1983.52
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that: 1) the Complaint
sought to impose liability on the state officials in their personal capacities and therefore was not an action against the State barred by
the Eleventh Amendment;53 and 2) executive officials are not absolutely shielded from liability under Section 1983 but may assert only
a qualified immunity.54 Because neither the district court nor court
of appeals had considered the qualified immunity defense, the
Court acknowledged that “[t]hese cases in their present posture,
present no occasion for a definitive exploration of the scope of immunity available to state executive officials nor, because of the absence of a factual record, do they permit a determination as to the
applicability of [immunity] principles to the [defendants] here.”55
Nonetheless, the Scheuer Court proceeded to articulate what it
deemed to be the governing test.
48. Id. at 235.
49. Id. at 234.
50. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
51. Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 234.
52. Id. at 234–35.
53. Id. at 239.
54. Id. at 243–44.
55. Id. at 249. In support of their motion to dismiss, defendants had submitted
a proclamation issued by the Governor spelling out the prevailing conditions at
Kent State as well as a proclamation calling up the National Guard in response to
violence erupting from strikes in the trucking industry. Id. at 236.
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The Scheuer Court first asserted that the immunity test of good
faith and probable cause it afforded police officers in Pierson
should not apply to “higher officers of the executive branch.”56
Qualified immunity, the Court reasoned, was designed to promote
“the public interest [that] requires decisions and actions to enforce
laws for the protection of public,” with the attendant assumption
“that it is better to risk some error and probable injury from such
error than not to decide or act at all.”57 Because upper-level executive officials possess a far broader scope of responsibilities, duties,
and options than line police officers, they must be entitled to exercise a wider swath of decision-making free from the specter of liability.58 While Pierson allowed officers to avoid liability only by
pointing to a then-valid state law that authorized their conduct, the
Scheuer Court promulgated a test that considered all the variables
that went into the officials’ decision to act:
[I]n varying scope, a qualified immunity is available to officers of
the executive branch of government, the variation being dependent upon the scope of discretion and responsibilities of the office and all the circumstances as they reasonably appeared at the
time of the action on which liability is sought to be based. It is the
existence of reasonable grounds for the belief formed at the time
and in light of all the circumstances, coupled with good-faith belief, that affords a basis for qualified immunity.59

While expressly declining to rule on or suggest how this immunity standard would apply to the Scheuer litigation, the Court identified several criteria it deemed relevant. The Court offered that
state executive officials “are entitled to rely on traditional sources
for the factual information” used to make their decisions, including
relying upon facts supplied by others in instances where immediate
action was necessary.60 It further indicated that state law should be
56. Id. at 246.
57. Id. at 241–42. Common law immunity, the Court noted:
rested, in its genesis on two mutually dependent rationales: (1) the injustice, particularly in the absence of bad faith, of subjecting to liability an
officer who is required, by the legal obligations of his position, to exercise
discretion; (2) the danger that the threat of such liability would deter his
willingness to execute his office with the decisiveness and the judgment
required by the public good.
Id. at 240.
58. Id. at 246.
59. Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 247 (emphasis added). Earlier in the opinion, the
Court likewise noted that whether the officers were immune should turn on “all of
the circumstances that may be revealed by the evidence.” Id. at 239 (emphasis
added).
60. Id. at 246.
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consulted to ascertain the breadth of the official’s duties and the
discretion required to carry out those responsibilities.61 As to the
line officers, the Court concluded that further proceedings would be
needed to determine whether these officials “acted in good-faith
obedience to the orders of their superiors.”62
At no point did the Scheuer Court prescribe or imply that lack
of clarity as to whether the official’s actions violated the federal
constitutional right was a relevant, much less dispositive, factor in
the immunity calculus. To the contrary, the Court acknowledged
that “final resolution of the immunity question must take into account . . . the purposes of § 1983,”63 and “[w]hen there is a substantial showing that the exertion of state power has overridden private
rights secured by [the Federal] Constitution, the subject is necessarily one for judicial inquiry in an appropriate proceeding directed
against the individuals charged with the transgression.”64 Yet in
Wood v. Strickland,65 the Court gratuitously injected a new element
into the analysis of immunity—whether the constitutional right violated was “clearly established.”
3. A Spiked Punchbowl at a High School Event Gives Rise to
the Unprecedented Concept of “Clearly Established
Rights”
If not for the fact that it proved to be an inflection point for the
prodigious expansion of qualified immunity, Wood66 would make
no one’s list of the thousand most consequential Supreme Court
opinions. The case arose out of a failed high school prank. Plaintiffs
were high school students who purchased two 12-ounce bottles of
malt liquor, combined them with soft drinks, and surreptitiously added the mixture to the punch served at a parent-student function
sponsored by the school’s Home Economics Department.67 The alcohol was so diluted that no one attending the gathering recognized
61. Id. at 250. The Court stated:
The documents properly before the District Court at this early pleading
stage specifically placed in issue whether the Governor and his
subordinate officers were acting within the scope of their duties under the
Constitution and laws of Ohio; [and] whether they acted within the range
of discretion permitted the holders of the office under Ohio law . . . .
Id.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id.
Id. at 243.
Id. at 249 (quoting Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 397–98 (1932)).
Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
Id.
Id. at 311.
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the punch had been spiked.68 Even so, the school board upheld the
suspension of the students for violating its regulation prohibiting
the possession of “intoxicating beverages” at school or school
activities.69
The students filed a Section 1983 action against members of
the school board, alleging their suspension violated both substantive and procedural due process guarantees of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution.70 In short, the students alleged that because the amount of alcohol in the spiked
punch was 0.91 percent (well below the minimum 5-percent level
that Arkansas law defined as “intoxicating liquor,”) there was no
evidence supporting the board’s suspension of the students under
the school regulation.71
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury was unable to reach a
verdict.72 The district court then entered a verdict for the school
board officials, finding there was no evidence that the officials had
acted with malice in expelling the students.73 The court of appeals
reversed, ruling that the school board members violated the substantive due process rights of the students because: a) no evidence
was presented as to the alcoholic content of the mixture the students used to spike the punch; and b) the board made no finding
that the malt liquor/soda combination the students added to the
punch was intoxicating.74
In addition to ordering the students’ records cleared and any
continuing punishments lifted, the court of appeals remanded the
case for a new trial on the claim for damages.75 The court of appeals
held that the trial court erred in requiring that, to override immunity, the students must prove specific intent to harm.76 Rather,
plaintiffs “need only [establish] that the defendants did not, in light
of all the circumstances, act in good faith. The test is an objective,
rather than a subjective, one.”77
At no point did the court of appeals suggest that the settled or
unsettled status of decisions interpreting the substantive due process rights of the students should be considered, much less determi68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id.
Id. at 313.
Strickland v. Inlow, 485 F.2d 186, 190 (8th Cir. 1973).
Wood, 420 U.S. at 323.
Id. at 310.
Id.
Id. at 323–24.
Id. at 310.
Id. at 314.
Strickland, 485 F.2d at 191.
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native, in evaluating the immunity defense.78 Nor did the parties so
argue in their submissions to the Supreme Court.79 Nonetheless, the
Supreme Court sua sponte interposed whether the federal constitutional right at issue was “clearly established” as an element of
immunity.80
Resolving the disagreement between the district court and the
court of appeals, the Supreme Court held that to be relieved from
civil liability, the official must satisfy both: a) the requirement that
the official has acted subjectively in good faith; and b) the objective
immunity standard.81 As to the latter, the Court approvingly invoked the test for immunity set forth in Scheuer v. Rhodes,82 reasoning that “the immunity must be such that public school officials
understand that action taken . . . within the bounds of reason under
all the circumstances will not be punished.”83 In elaborating on the
application of the immunity standard, however, the Court, for the
first time, introduced the state of the law into the equation. The
Court offered that school board members “must be held to a standard based not only on permissible intentions, but also on knowledge of the basic, unquestioned constitutional rights of [their]
charges.”84 It similarly volunteered that:
A compensatory award will be appropriate only if the school
board member has acted with such an impermissible motivation
or with such disregard of the student’s clearly established constitutional rights that his action cannot be reasonably be characterized
as being in good faith.85
78. The court of appeals did observe that “the law with respect to rights of
students is still developing,” but noted that the general principle that students may
not be given lengthy suspensions for violating a valid rule without being afforded
substantive and procedural due process was “reasonably well established.” Strickland, 485 F.2d at 189.
79. During oral argument, the board members’ counsel conceded that Scheuer
v. Rhodes supplied the applicable immunity standard. Transcript of Oral Argument
at 11, Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975) (No. 73-1285).
80. Wood, 420 U.S. at 323.
81. Id. at 321.
82. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
83. Wood, 420 U.S. at 321 (emphasis added). The Scheuer Court had promulgated the immunity test for high executive officials. The Wood Court, however,
found the Scheuer test applicable without inquiring into the nature of the duties of
school board officials. JUSTICE THOMAS has criticized the Courts’ abandonment of
an inquiry into the scope of the responsibilities of the official invoking immunity in
favor of a “one-size fits all doctrine.” Hoggard v. Rhodes, 141 S. Ct. 2421 (2021)
(THOMAS, J., concurring in the denial of certiorari); Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct.
1843, 1871 (2017) (THOMAS, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
84. Wood, 420 U.S. at 322.
85. Id.
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The Court cited no authority for deeming the state of federal
constitutional law germane to immunity analysis, and the Court had
no occasion to consider the explicitness of the rights at issue in its
ruling.86 The four dissenting Justices, however, were exorcised over
what they construed as the automatic loss of immunity for failure to
satisfy the subjective prong whenever the right violated was clearly
established:
The Court states the standard of required knowledge in two cryptic phrases: “settled, indisputable law” and “unquestioned constitutional rights.” Presumably these are intended to mean the same
thing, though the meaning of neither phrase is likely to be selfevident to constitutional law scholars—much less the average
school board member. One need only look to the decisions of
this Court—to our reversals, our recognition of evolving concepts, and our five-to-four splits—to recognize the hazard of
even informed prophecy as to what are “unquestioned constitutional rights.”87

The dissenters denounced the majority’s test as less protective
of government officials than what they viewed as the appropriate
test the Court had set forth less than a year earlier in Scheuer—
“whether in light of the discretion and responsibilities of the office,
and under all the circumstances as they appeared at the time, the
officer acted reasonably and in good faith.”88
4. Flip-flopping Who Is Victimized by Assigning the State of the
Law a Preeminent Role in Immunity Analysis
The dissenters in Wood v. Strickland were deeply troubled that
the impossibility of determining whether a constitutional right was
clearly established would unfairly impose liability on public officials. Two years later, and without confessing that they were enlarging the scope of immunity, the Court in Procunier v. Navarette89
rendered the citizen whose rights were infringed the victim of implanting the notion of “clearly established rights” into the legal test
for qualified immunity.
86. The Court ruled that the school board had not violated the substantive
due process rights of the students because there was sufficient evidence to support
the charge that the students had violated the school regulation prohibiting the use
or possession of intoxicating beverages at a school activity. Id. at 325. Because the
lower courts had failed to rule on the students’ claimed violation of procedural due
process, the Court remanded that issue to the court of appeals. Id. at 328.
87. Id. at 329 (Powell, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 330 (Powell, J., dissenting).
89. Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978).
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Navarette, an inmate at California’s Soledad prison, alleged
that subordinate and supervisory officials had violated his First
Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment rights by failing to send
Navarette’s outgoing mail to legal assistance groups, law students,
news media, inmates at other prisons, and Navarette’s personal
friends.90 State regulations permitted inmates to send letters to ten
people on an approved list, as well as to correspond with their attorneys.91 Contrary to these regulations, the warden harbored the
view that officials had the right to confiscate any mail “if we don’t
feel it is right or necessary.”92 Navarette contended that guards confiscated his outgoing mail because they considered Navarette to be
a “troublesome ‘writ-writer.’”93
Navarette’s lone claim before the Court averred that the negligence of supervisory and subordinate officials caused the interference with his mail.94 The court of appeals had reversed the district
court’s grant of summary judgment to defendants, ruling that Section 1983 provides a cause of action for negligent deprivations of
constitutional rights. The court of appeals further had found that
there were issues of material fact as to the “reasonable and good
faith belief” of the officials that their conduct was lawful.95 The Supreme Court granted certiorari only as to the first basis of the court
of appeal’s decision, agreeing to review, “[w]hether negligent failure to mail certain of a prisoner’s outgoing letters states a cause of
action under Section 1983.”96
While the Court had granted certiorari to determine only
whether Congress intended Section 1983 to provide redress for negligent infringements of constitutional rights, the Court did not reach
that issue.97 Instead, the Court ruled that the prison officials were
entitled to summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity.98 The parties had not argued or briefed the immunity issue—
and most certainly did not advocate for or against alteration of the
90. Id. at 557.
91. Id. at 557 n.3.
92. Id. at 570 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 559.
95. Id. at 559.
96. Id. at 567 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
97. The Court subsequently ruled that Section 1983 does not require a plaintiff to prove any culpability beyond the standard of fault imposed by the constitutional right at issue. See generally Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986); Parratt
v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
98. Procunier, 424 U.S. at 565.
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pre-existing doctrine.99 Yet Justice White, author of the majority
opinion in Wood now writing for the Procunier majority, blithely
inverted the impact of the newly-minted concept of clearly established rights.100 Contrary to the dissenter’s construction in Wood,
government officials would not be denied immunity whenever the
right violated was clearly established. Rather,
[u]nder the first [objective] part of the Wood v. Strickland rule,
the immunity defense would be unavailing [to the public official]
if the constitutional right allegedly infringed by them was clearly
established at the time of the changed conduct, if they knew or
should have known of that right, and if they knew or should have
known that their conduct violated the constitutional norm.101

Under the standard newly promulgated in Procunier, even
where the constitutional right violated was clearly established, the
official had two additional means of satisfying the objective element
of the immunity defense. The official could prevail if, under all the
circumstances, they did not know and should not have known of the
right. Even if the right was clearly established and the officials knew
or should have known of the right, the official nonetheless would be
immune if they did not know and should not have known that their
conduct violated that right.
While the official is afforded two additional avenues to secure
immunity where the right was clearly established, the citizen whose
rights were invaded has no means to prevail on the objective element of immunity where the right violated was not clearly established. A plaintiff may not argue the official knew or should have
known of the right, or that the official knew or should have known
that their conduct violated the constitutional norm. The Procunier
Court found that no clearly established First Amendment right protected prisoner correspondence at the time Navarette was incarcer99. The briefs of the parties referred to the immunity test only for analogous
authority in support of their argument as to whether Section 1983 redresses negligent conduct. See Brief for Petitioners at 12–13, Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S.
555 (1978) (No. 76-446) (arguing that the qualified immunity test in Pierson v. Ray
and Wood v. Strickland limited Section 1983 to intentional conduct); Brief for Respondent at 20–27, Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978) (No. 76-446); Brief
for the American Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents
at 10, 14–15, Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978) (No. 76-446) (arguing that
qualified immunity cases support liability for objectively unreasonable constitutional invasions). Chief Justice Burger dissented from the Court’s choice to address
immunity, finding the issue not fairly comprised within the issue on which the
Court had granted certiorari. Procunier, 434 U.S. at 567 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
100. Procunier, 434 U.S. at 565.
101. Id. at 562 (emphasis added).
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ated.102 Consequently, the Court ruled as a matter of law that the
prison officials satisfied the objective prong of the qualified immunity test.103 The Court did not allow consideration of whether the
unambiguous state regulations the warden flaunted affected the objective reasonableness of the warden’s belief that he had unfettered
discretion to seize inmate’s mailings.104
The Procunier Court never acknowledged that without benefit
of the view of the lower courts or the argument of the parties, it was
widening the swath of immunity it had set forth in Wood v. Strickland (which itself was an unacknowledged enlargement of the immunity prescribed in Scheuer v. Rhodes). The Court did not tether
its expansion to the common law, the fount of qualified immunity
under Section 1983.105 As the Court later admitted, Procunier “simply set forth a policy prescription.”106 However, at no point did the
Procunier Court explain why preserving the exercise of governmental discretion required exonerating officials whose belief that their
conduct complied with constitutional norms was, under all the circumstances, unreasonable.
5. Immunizing Intentional Violations of the Constitution
After Procunier, where the right violated was not clearly established, the citizen could overcome immunity only if the official acted with the “malicious intent to cause a deprivation of
constitutional rights or other injury.”107 The Court closed that small
window of recovery when, in Harlow v. Fitzgerald,108 it abrogated
the subjective prong of the immunity test.
Harlow arose out of the suit by A. Ernest Fitzgerald, an analyst
for the Department of the Air Force, alleging he had been dismissed in retaliation for his testimony before a congressional subcommittee, in violation of the First Amendment to the United
102. Id. at 565.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 565 n.13 (“There is thus no occasion to . . . inquire whether petitioners knew or should have known that their conduct was in violation of that
constitutional proscription.”).
105. Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 611 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Justice Scalia justified expanding immunity beyond the common law contours to
correct what he viewed as the Court’s incorrect holding in Monroe v. Pape, 365
U.S. 167 (1961) that officials act under color of law even when their actions violate
state law. Id.
106. Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 416 (1997).
107. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975).
108. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
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States Constitution.109 Fitzgerald had testified about technical
problems and cost overruns likely to reach two billion dollars on
the C-5A transport plane.110 Fitzgerald sued senior White House
aides Alexander Butterfield and Bryce Harlow, among others.111
The case reached the Supreme Court following the district
court’s denial of defendants’ motion for summary judgment and the
court of appeals dismissal, without opinion, of defendants’ appeal
of that judgment.112 While rejecting defendants’ claims to absolute
immunity,113 the Court held that government officials no longer
would be required to act in subjective good faith to be excused from
liability by qualified immunity.114
The Court found that eliminating the subjective tier of the immunity defense was necessary to avoid the costs that litigation imposes on government employees and society.115 The Court
reasoned that citizen suits seeking damages for deprivation of their
constitutional rights not only subject the defendant-official to the
expenses of lawsuits but cause “the diversion of official energy from
pressing public issues, and the deterrence of able citizens from acceptance of public office.”116 Therefore, the Court concluded, the
immunity standard must “permit the defeat of insubstantial claims
without resort to trial.”117
Ignoring available empirical evidence,118 the Court presumed
that to require the official to act in good faith in order to be im109. Fitzgerald’s Complaint also alleged violations of two federal statutes: 5
U.S.C. § 7211 and 18 U.S.C. § 1505. Id. at 805.
110. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 733–34 (1982).
111. Fitzgerald also named President Richard Nixon as a defendant. In a separate opinion, the Court held that Nixon was entitled to absolute immunity for all
official acts within the “outer perimeter” of his duties of office. Id. at 755–57.
112. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 805–06.
113. Id. at 807–13.
114. Id. at 817–18.
115. Id. at 816.
116. Id. at 814.
117. Id. at 813.
118. See Theodore Eisenberg, Section 1983: Doctrinal Foundations and an
Empirical Study, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 482, 550–54 (1982) (demonstrating that out
of 212 prisoner § 1983 claims filed in the Central District of California, depositions
were conducted in 5 cases and 3 cases proceeded to trial); William Bennett Turner,
When Prisoners Sue: A Study of Prisoner Section 1983 Suits in the Federal Courts,
92 HARV. L. REV. 610, 624 (1979) (studying prisoner suits over a 3-year period in 5
federal districts and finding that few prisoners attempted discovery and only 18 of
664 cases had either an evidentiary hearing or trial). But see Theodore Eisenberg
& Stewart Schwab, The Reality of Constitutional Tort Litigation, 72 CORNELL L.
REV. 641, 675 (1987) (finding discovery, pretrial hearings, and trial “somewhat”
more likely in constitutional tort cases, but cautioning that conclusions were limited to a single district and suggesting “decision makers demand evidence to support assertions about constitutional tort cases, and that they not act in the
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mune thwarted the ability of courts to dispose of cases on motions
for summary judgment.119 While defendants had asked neither the
lower courts nor the Supreme Court to do so,120 the Court: a) abolished the subjective element of the legal test for qualified immunity;
and b) further held that trial courts should not permit discovery
until ruling on whether the constitutional right at issue was clearly
established at the time of the alleged violation.121
After Harlow, public officials are immune from liability for
harms caused by their unconstitutional conduct whenever the right
violated was not clearly established, even if they intended to injure
the citizen. Consequently, Congress’ goals of compensating victims
and deterring deprivations of the Constitution now turns on how
generously or stingily courts determine that a right is clearly established. The Supreme Court’s commandments on how lower courts
are to ascertain when a constitutional right is clearly established,
which will be examined next, elevate qualified immunity to a nearinsurmountable obstacle to redress.
6. Application of the Qualified Immunity Test: When Is a Right
Clearly Established?
Two principal questions have shaped the landscape regarding
when a constitutional right is clearly established: 1) may courts conempirical void that has dominated discussion to date”). The Court assumed its expansion of immunity would not undermine the goals of compensation of victims
and deterrence of unconstitutional acts that Section 1983 and Bivens actions were
designed to achieve. However, a study of all reported Bivens actions published 3
years before the Harlow decision revealed that plaintiffs had prevailed only in 5 of
the 136 cases in which judgment or dismissal had been entered. W. Mark Smith,
Note, “Damages or Nothing”—The Efficacy of the Bivens-Type Remedy, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 667, 694 (1979). A more recent, post-Harlow empirical inquiry found
plaintiffs had succeeded in 16 percent of Bivens actions. Alexander Reinert, Measuring the Success of Bivens Litigation and Its Consequences for the Individual Liability Model, 62 STAN. L. REV. 809, 837 (2010).
119. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
120. Defendants argued that the Court should require plaintiff to satisfy either a preponderance of the evidence or a clear and convincing evidence standard
in order to survive a motion for summary judgment. Brief for the Petitioners at 79,
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) (Nos. 79-1738, 80-945). During oral argument, counsel reiterated that defendants were urging the Court to require plaintiffs to prove malice by a standard that was more demanding than a preponderance
of the evidence. Transcript of Oral Argument at 14, Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
800 (1982) (Nos. 79-1738, 80-945), 1981 U.S. Trans. LEXIS 17. Counsel submitted
that the Court could “significantly reduce the number of cases that would have to
go to trial and increase the number in which a motion for summary judgment was
granted” if the Court were “to enjoin upon the lower courts close scrutiny of allegations of malice, applying the two standards of Wood against Strickland.” Id. at 20
(emphasis added).
121. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
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sider sources beyond judicial interpretations of the United States
Constitution; and 2) with what degree of factual specificity must the
right have been defined to be deemed clearly established?122 The
Supreme Court’s answers to both questions have dramatically narrowed the circumstances under which a right may be clearly established, correspondingly quashing the ability of the victims of
unconstitutional conduct to hold government officials accountable
for their injures.
a. Sources Used in the Clearly Established Rights Calculus
In its first post-Harlow qualified immunity decision, Davis v.
Scherer,123 the Supreme Court held that courts may look only to
judicial opinions interpreting the federal constitutional right allegedly violated to determine whether the right is clearly established.124 Like many of the Court’s immunity decisions, Davis did
not arise out of a headline-grabbing invasion of the Constitution.
Gregory Scherer worked for the Florida Highway Patrol as a radioteletype operator.125 As required by departmental conflict-of-interest policies, Scherer sought and received permission to take on additional part-time work as a reserve deputy with the Escambia
County Sheriff’s Office.126 Because he had already purchased new
uniforms, Scherer refused to quit his deputy sheriff job after his
superiors at the Highway Patrol revoked their approval.127 Florida
Highway Patrol officials then fired Scherer.128
Scherer appealed his firing to the Florida Career Service Commission.129 While the appeal was pending, Scherer reached a settlement with the Highway Patrol that reinstated Scherer with
backpay.130 Bad blood between Scherer and his Highway Patrol
122. In addition to these questions, the instances in which a right will be
clearly established may be further diminished depending on how the Supreme
Court answers the open question of whether only its own decisions can clearly
establish a right. See Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna, 142 S. Ct. 4, 8 (2021); District of
Columbia v. Westby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 591 (2018); Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658,
665–66 (2012); cf. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d) (stating that the application for writ of habeas corpus with respect
to a claim adjudicated in a state court proceeding shall not be granted unless the
decision “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States”).
123. Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984).
124. Id. at 194.
125. Id. at 185.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 186.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
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superiors continued, and Scherer was suspended.131 Scherer resigned and then filed a Section 1983 action alleging that he had
been fired initially without a formal pretermination or prompt posttermination hearing in violation of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.132
The district court found that Florida Highway Patrol officials
had fired Scherer without affording constitutionally adequate procedures. Applying the totality of the circumstances test set forth in
Scheuer v. Rhodes, the trial court further found the officials were
not entitled to qualified immunity.133 Two years before Scherer’s
dismissal, the Florida Attorney General had issued an official opinion providing that persons in Scherer’s status “have acquired a
property interest in their public positions and emoluments
thereof—such as job security and seniority which they may not be
deprived of without due process of law.”134 Additionally, two
months before Scherer’s firing, the Florida Highway Patrol had issued a regulation that required a complete investigation of the facts
surrounding the alleged offense, a written statement by the employee against whom the complaint was made, and, if a decision
was made to dismiss the employee, a requirement that the department official present the employee a written statement of the reasons for the dismissal.135 The district court found that in light of
these authorities, the officials’ beliefs in the legality of their conduct
was unreasonable.136 The court of appeals affirmed the opinion of
the district court.137
While finding no dispute that the Highway Patrol officials had
violated the Fourteenth Amendment,138 the Supreme Court reversed the lower courts’ denial of qualified immunity.139 The Court
held that the court of appeals erred in considered the officials’ violations of unambiguous state regulations in assessing the objective
reasonableness of their conduct.140 The Court reasoned that immunity must be calibrated to allow officials to reasonably anticipate
131. Id.
132. Id. at 187.
133. Davis, 468 U.S. at 187.
134. Id. at 203 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing
Off. of the Atty. Gen. of Fla., Opinion Letter 75-94 on Refusal to Take Polygraph
(Apr. 14, 1975)).
135. Davis, 468 U.S. at 204 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (citations omitted).
136. Id. at 189 (majority opinion).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 190.
139. Id. at 197.
140. Id. at 193–96.

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\126-3\DIK303.txt

2022]

THE NEUROSCIENCE

unknown

OF

Seq: 27

5-MAY-22

QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

9:30

795

when their conduct may give rise to liability for damages and to
facilitate expeditious dismissal of unjustified lawsuits.141 Inclusion
of state regulations in the immunity calculus would: a) risk subjecting officials to liability for otherwise unforeseeable violations of the
Constitution “merely because their official conduct also violated
some statute or regulation”;142 and b) require judges to interpret
state administrative regulations, impeding their ability to grant
summary judgment.143 Furthermore, because a variety of rules and
regulations govern officials’ conduct, subjecting these actors to
money damages for non-compliance would unduly induce them to
err on the side of caution.144 Hence, courts may look only to cases
interpreting the United States Constitution in finding that the right
was clearly established.145
b. The Degree of Factual Specificity with Which the
Constitutional Right Must Be Clearly Established by
Precedents
Because the Supreme Court has restricted courts to using cases
interpreting the federal right at issue, a plaintiff’s ability to overcome immunity and recover damages caused by an official’s violation of the Constitution turns on the factual specificity with which a
right is to be considered clearly established. In Anderson v. Creigh141. Id. at 195.
142. Id. While holding that violation of a state regulation cannot clarify law
otherwise lacking in case precedents, the Court on occasion has invoked regulations and policies to support its determination that judicial opinions clearly established a right. See Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 564 n.7 (2004) (referencing a
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms directive requiring agents to verify that
a search warrant issued by magistrate is sufficient on its face); Hope v. Pelzer, 53
U.S. 730, 743–44 (2002) (citing an Alabama Department of Corrections regulation
constraining conditions that justify handcuffing a prisoner to a hitching post).
143. Davis, 468 U.S. at 195.
144. Id. at 196.
145. While a plaintiff may not utilize authorities outside judicial interpretations of the Constitution, the defendant official may offer extra-constitutional
sources to support the objective reasonableness of their unconstitutional actions.
The origin of the qualified immunity defense—Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547
(1967)—is the paradigm case of excusing a violation of the Constitution where the
police officers were enforcing a then-valid state law. In Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S.
603, 617 (1999), the Court invoked ride-along policies and practices of the United
States Marshals’ service and the Montgomery County Sheriff’s Department to support the reasonableness of police officers’ belief that it was constitutional to invite
members of the media to accompany them in executing warrants on private homes.
See also Roska v. Peterson, 328 F.3d 1230, 1251 (10th Cir. 2003) (“In considering
the ‘objective legal reasonableness’ of the state officer’s actions, one relevant factor is whether the defendant relied on a state statute, regulation, or official policy
that explicitly sanctioned the conduct in question.”).
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ton,146 the Court issued the first in a series of opinions insisting,
with ever-increasing rigor, that a court may find a right clearly established only where the facts of the precedent case(s) closely parallel the facts giving rise to the constitutional deprivation.147
The facts of Anderson were eerily reminiscent of the events
giving rise to the seminal Section 1983 case, Monroe v. Pape.148
Robert and Sarisse Creighton and their daughter, all of whom were
Black, observed a spotlight shining into the front window of their
home.149 Mr. Creighton went to the front door where he was confronted by uniformed and plain clothes officers, all of whom were
white and with several holding shotguns. One officer told Mr.
Creighton to “keep his hands in sight” as the other officers ran into
the house.150 When Mr. Creighton asked whether the officers had a
search warrant, an officer replied, “we don’t have a search warrant
and don’t need [one]; you watch too much TV.”151 The officers then
refused Mr. Creighton’s request to put away their guns.152 Mrs.
Creighton, awakened by the shrieking of her children, was greeted
by an officer pointing a shotgun at her.153 She also witnessed other
officers yelling at her daughters to “sit their damn asses down and
stop screaming.”154 Mrs. Creighton asked an officer to explain
“what the hell is going on,” and the officer replied, “why don’t you
make your damn kids sit on the couch and make them shut up.”155
The abuse of the Creightons continued. One officer punched
Mr. Creighton in the face, and another hit Mr. Creighton’s tenyear-old daughter when she screamed for her mother to come
help.156 When Mrs. Creighton began to phone her mother, an officer kicked her and grabbed the phone.157 The children ran out of
the house, and an officer chased one of the girls into the home of a
neighbor.158 Mrs. Creighton later took her daughter to the emer146. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987).
147. Id. at 640–41.
148. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). Monroe expanded the availability
of a federal civil action for redress of constitutional rights by holding that officials
act “under color of law” for purposes of Section 1983 even where their conduct
violated state law and the state courts afford a tort remedy for that wrongdoing.
149. Creighton v. City of St. Paul, 766 F.2d 1269, 1270 (8th Cir. 1985) vacated
sub nom. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987).
150. Id. at 1270.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1271.
157. Id.
158. Id.
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gency room to treat the arm that had been injured when the officer
grabbed and shook her.159
Mrs. Creighton also asked FBI Agent Anderson for a search
warrant.160 He replied, “I don’t need a damn warrant when I’m
looking for a fugitive.”161 Unbeknownst to the Creightons, the officers were seeking Mrs. Creighton’s brother, who was suspected of
committing an armed robbery earlier that afternoon, and had conducted unsuccessful, warrantless searches at the homes of Mrs.
Creighton’s mother and grandmother.162 Despite finding no fugitive, no evidence that a fugitive had been present, and no evidence
that the Creighton’s were involved in criminal activity of any sort,
the officers arrested Mr. Creighton for obstruction of justice, handcuffed him, and placed him in the jail at the police station.163 The
police released Mr. Creighton the next day without pressing any
charges.164
The Creightons filed an action against the officers involved in
the search, partially seeking damages for violation of their rights
under the Fourth Amendment.165 The district court granted FBI
Agent Anderson’s motion for summary judgment on the ground of
qualified immunity.166 The court of appeals reversed.167 The court
ruled that there were material issues of fact as to whether the officers had probable cause to believe that Mrs. Creighton’s brother
was present at the Creighton home the night of the search and
whether exigent circumstances excused the need for a search
warrant.168
The court of appeals then turned to the issue of immunity.169
Referencing its detailed analysis and application of prior cases (in
which the court found officers did not satisfy the requisites excusing
a warrant when in hot pursuit of a suspect or when concerned about
destruction of evidence), the court of appeals ruled that both the
Creighton’s Fourth Amendment rights and the exigent circumstances doctrine were clearly established at the time of the
search.170 Furthermore, the court found that Anderson had offered
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Creighton v. City of St. Paul, 766 F.2d at 1271.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 637 (8th Cir. 1985).
Id.
Id. at 637–38.
Id.; Creighton v. City of St. Paul, 766 F.2d at 1273–75.
Creighton v. City of St. Paul, 766 F.2d at 1276.
Id.
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no evidence that he reasonably could have been unaware of that
clearly established law.171
The Supreme Court held that the court of appeals improperly
found that Creighton’s Fourth Amendment rights were clearly established by assessing the right at too high a level of generality:
[O]ur cases establish that the right the official is alleged to have
violated must have been “clearly established” in a more particularized, and hence more relevant, sense: The contours of the right
must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right. This is not to say
that an official action is protected by qualified immunity unless
the very action in question has previously been held unlawful . . .
but it is to say that in the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent.172

While recognizing it was clearly established that an officer
must possess both probable cause to search and exigent circumstances to excuse procuring a warrant, the Court reasoned that the
court of appeals erred by failing to consider whether it was clearly
established that the facts confronting Agent Anderson did not meet
these constitutional mandates.173 The Court then offered the following standard for assessing when a right is deemed clearly
established:
The relevant question in this case, for example, is the objective
(albeit fact-specific) question whether a reasonable officer could
have believed Anderson’s warrantless search to be lawful, in light
of clearly established law and the information the searching officers possessed.174

In subsequent cases, the Court progressively reframed the test
to require ever-closer factual resemblance between the precedents
establishing the constitutional right and the facts of the case in
which plaintiff is seeking recovery for violation of that right. In
Hope v. Pelzer,175 the Court proclaimed that the facts of the precedents must afford the officer “fair warning” that their conduct
would violate constitutional norms:
Officials can still be on notice that their conduct violates established law even in novel factual circumstances. Indeed, in Lanier,
we expressly rejected a requirement that previous cases be “fun171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Id. at 1277.
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. at 640.
Id. at 640–41.
Id.
Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002).
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damentally similar.” Although earlier cases involving “fundamentally similar” facts can provide especially strong support for a
conclusion that the law is clearly established, they are not necessary to such a finding. The same is true of cases with “materially
similar” facts. Accordingly, pursuant to Lanier, the salient question that the Court of Appeals ought to have asked is whether
the state of the law in 1995 gave respondents fair warning that
their alleged treatment of Hope was unconstitutional.176

In later decisions, however, the Court increasingly mandated
that the facts of precedent cases must more strictly mirror the facts
of the case at bar before the right violated can be considered clearly
established. In Brosseau v. Haugen,177 the Court reversed the lower
court’s denial of immunity, finding that none of the cases relied on
by the court of appeals “squarely governs the case here.”178 The
Court admonished that an analysis of whether precedents clearly
established the right “must be undertaken in light of the specific
context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.”179 In
Reichle v. Howards,180 the Court declared: “[a] clearly established
right is one that is “sufficiently clear that every reasonable official
would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.”181
In Ashcroft v. Iqbal,182 the Court pronounced that for a right to be
clearly established, “[w]e do not require a case directly on point,
but existing precedent must have placed the constitutional question
beyond debate.”183 In Saucier v. Katz,184 the Court admonished that
in suits by victims of police misconduct, it is especially important to
require a near factual match to precedents because “[i]t is sometimes difficult for an officer to determine how the relevant legal
doctrine, here excessive force, will apply to the factual situation the
office confronts.”185 Finally, in Messerschmidt v. Millender,186 the
Court signaled that immunity was to be presumed, with “the threshold for establishing [an] exception a high one,” met only on “rare”
occasions.187
176. Id. at 741.
177. Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194 (2004) (per curiam).
178. Id. at 201.
179. Id. at 198 (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2011)).
180. Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658 (2012).
181. Id. at 664 (emphasis added).
182. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 563 U.S. 731 (2011).
183. Id. at 741 (emphasis added).
184. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001).
185. Id. at 205.
186. Messerschmidt v. Millender, 565 U.S. 535 (2012).
187. Id. at 546. Independent of its application of the test for when a right is
clearly established, the Court’s decision in Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223
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In a series of per curiam opinions, the Supreme Court made
unmistakable its insistence on tight factual correspondence between
precedent cases and the constitutional violation sought to be redressed before a right could be seen as clearly established.188 An
autopsy of one of these cases, Mullenix v. Luna,189 reveals the tools
employed by the Court to find factual distinctions that—in all but
rare cases with “particularly egregious facts”190—will preempt a
finding that a constitutional right is clearly established.191
Mullenix arose out of the suit by the Estate of Israel Leija, Jr.,
who had been shot to death by Texas Department of Public Safety
Trooper Chadrin Mullenix.192 Leija led police officers on a high
speed chase after they unsuccessfully tried to arrest Leija to revoke
(2009) decreased the likelihood that precedents will factually place the constitutional question beyond debate. In Saucier v. Katz, 532 U.S. 194 (2001), the Court
had mandated that a judge ruling on a qualified immunity claim must first determine whether there was sufficient evidence that the official had contravened the
Constitution before turning to the issue of whether the right was clearly established. In Pearson, the Court overruled the mandatory order of decision, holding
that courts have discretion to immediately address the immunity question and, if
finding the right not clearly established, decline to address the constitutionality of
the officer’s conduct. After Pearson, there will be fewer instances in which courts
reach the substantive question of whether the right was violated, and there will be
consequently decreased instances in which facts will clearly establish a right for
future cases.
188. See, e.g., City of Tahlequah v. Bond, 142 S. Ct. 9 (2021) (per curiam)
(reversing a denial of immunity to officers who shot and killed Dominic Rollins in
the garage of his ex-wife’s house after Rollins raised a hammer behind his head
and took a stance suggesting he was about to throw the hammer or charge at the
officers); Rivas-Villejas v. Cortesluna, 142 S. Ct. 4 (2021) (per curiam) (reversing a
denial of immunity to a police officer who was sued for excessive force for placing
a knee on the back of a suspect who was lying face-down on the ground); Kisela v.
Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148 (2018) (per curiam); White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548 (2017)
(per curiam); Taylor v. Barkes, 575 U.S. 822 (2015) (per curiam); Carroll v. Carman, 574 U.S. 13 (2014) (per curiam); Stanton v. Sims, 571 U.S. 3 (2013) (per
curiam) (reversing a denial of qualified immunity for a warrantless entry to arrest a
fleeing suspect for a misdemeanor); Brosseau v. Haugen, 542 U.S. 194 (2004) (per
curiam). More generally, defendants have prevailed in nearly 80 percent of cases
presenting an issue of qualified immunity to the Supreme Court. See Alexander A.
Reinert, Qualified Immunity on Appeal: An Empirical Assessment 47 (Yeshiva
Univ. Benjamin N. Cardozo Sch. of L., Faculty Rsch. Paper No. 634, 2021), https://
bit.ly/3vrSKTR [https://perma.cc/9CT7-3PUG].
189. Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7 (2015).
190. See Taylor v. Riojas, 141 S. Ct. 52, 54 (2020) (reversing a court of appeals
decision that granted immunity where Taylor was confined for four days in a cell
covered with massive amounts of feces, causing him to refrain from eating or
drinking for fear of contamination, and then was moved to a second, frigidly cold
cell where he was required to sleep naked on the floor in sewage that spilled over
from a clogged drain in the floor, which was the only place in the cell to dispose of
bodily waste).
191. Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 12–19.
192. Id. at 8–9.
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his probation for a misdemeanor offense on the ground that Leija
had failed to perform all hours of his community service and an
intervening domestic violence petition had been lodged.193 The 18minute pursuit was at speeds between 85 and 110 miles per hour,
during which Leija had called the dispatcher and threatened to
shoot the police if they did not abandon the chase.194 Leija was
driving on an interstate highway, divided by a wide median, and at
all times remained on the paved part of the roadway with his headlights on.195 Because the events occurred around 10:30 in the evening in a rural area where there were no businesses or residences,
traffic was light and Leija did not drive past any pedestrians or vehicles stopped on the roadway, run any other car off the road, or
collide with any vehicle.196
While the chase was underway, police officers set up spike
strips, designed to flatten the tires of Leija’s car, across the interstate and underneath an overpass at Cemetery Road as well as in
two locations further up the roadway.197 The officers had been
trained both on how to deploy the spikes as well as how to assume a
position that would protect themselves from the driver and car as it
approached and passed over the spikes.198
Mullenix, who was on patrol 30 miles north of the pursuit, went
to the Cemetery Road overpass intending to set up tire spikes.199
Instead, he drove to a bridge 20 feet above the highway, planning to
disable Leija’s car by shooting his .223 caliber M-4 rifle at its engine
block.200 Mullenix had been trained only in shooting upwards at
moving clay pigeons; had no training on shooting to disable a moving vehicle; and had never attempted to or seen anyone do so.201
In the three minutes between arriving at the scene and firing
his rifle, Mullenix asked the dispatcher to contact Sergeant Byrd,
Mullenix’s supervisor, to ask whether Byrd thought shooting the car
was “worth doing.”202 Without waiting for a response, Mullenix left
his patrol car and took up a shooting position.203 While there was a
dispute of fact as to whether Mullenix heard the transmission, the
193.
(2015).
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

Luna v. Mullenix, 773 F.3d 712, 715 (5th Cir. 2014) rev’d 577 U.S. 7
Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 8.
Luna, 773 F.3d at 716.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 716–17.
Id.
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dispatcher relayed Sergeant Byrd’s instruction to “stand by” and
“see if the spikes work first.”204
Leija’s car approached the overpass at a speed of 85 miles per
hour (approximately 127 feet per second). When Leija was between
75 and 90 feet from the spike strips (less than 3 quarters of a second
before he would have driven over the strips), Mullenix fired 6
shots.205 At the time Mullenix fired his rifle, it was dark outside,
there were no streetlights or ambient lighting, and Mullenix could
not determine whether there were any passengers in Leija’s car or
what Leija was doing while driving.206
None of Mullenix’s shots hit the radiator hood or engine block
of Leija’s car.207 Four of the shots hit Leija in the upper body; Leija
was killed by the shot that struck him in the neck.208 Leija’s car
engaged the spike strips, hit the median, and rolled over two-andone-half times.209
In a counselling session earlier that day, Sergeant Byrd had advised Mullenix that he was not being sufficiently proactive.210
Speaking to Byrd after the shooting, Mullenix stated: “How’s that
for proactive?”211
Reviewing the district court’s denial of Mullenix’s motion for
summary judgment asserting immunity, the court of appeals first
addressed whether Leija’s estate had produced facts sufficient to
prove objectively unreasonable force.212 The court preliminarily
noted both that: a) Mullenix’s subjective intent or motivation was
not relevant; and b) the court was to evaluate the objective reasonableness of Mullenix’s actions in light of the specific facts and circumstances he encountered.213 The court then reiterated three
times the highly fact-specific nature of the reasonableness inquiry—
what it termed “the factbound morass of reasonableness.”214
The court first examined the facts concerning the severity and
immediacy of the threat of harm Leija posed to police officers and
others, referencing 3 cases from the United States Supreme Court,
3 cases from the 5th Circuit, and a case from the 11th Circuit assess204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

Id.
Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 23 (2015) (SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting).
Luna, 773 F.3d at 717.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 718–19.
Id.
Id.

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\126-3\DIK303.txt

2022]

THE NEUROSCIENCE

unknown

OF

Seq: 35

5-MAY-22

QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

9:30

803

ing that factor.215 The court reasoned that the facts, viewed in the
light most favorable to Leija, did not support a finding that Mullenix had acted reasonably to protect officers located beneath the
underpass or officers and motorists located further north of the initial set of spike strips.216 To the contrary, the particular facts of
Leija’s flight from the police—viewed in concert with the video of
the encounter as required by Scott v. Harris217—refuted each of the
risk factors that had supported a finding of reasonableness in highspeed chase decisions issued by the Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit.218 In those cases:
[M]ultiple other methods of stopping the suspect through alternate means had failed, the suspects were traveling on busy roads,
had forced multiple other drivers off the road, had caused collisions with officers or innocent bystanders, and at the time of the
shooting were indisputably posing an immediate threat to bystanders or other officers in the vicinity.219

The court did not disregard the threat to shoot officers Leija
had relayed to the dispatcher.220 Comparing Leija’s threats to the
facts of precedent cases, the court concluded, “[t]he factual scenario
here is substantially different, in terms of imminence and immediacy of the risk of harm, from situations where we have granted
qualified immunity to officers who shot an armed suspect believed
to be armed.”221
Finally, the court of appeals distinguished Mullenix’s actions
from the split-second judgments that the precedent cases relied on
to justify the use of deadly force.222 The court noted that Mullenix
215. Id. at 719–21.
216. Luna, 773 F.3d at 723.
217. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007).
218. Luna, 773 F.3d at 721.
219. Id. The court noted that while Leija was driving well in excess of the
speed limit, traffic in that rural area was light, there were no pedestrians, businesses, or residences near the highway, and Leija had not run any cars or police
vehicles off the road. Id. at 716.
220. Id. at 723.
221. Id. at 722. The court reasoned that Leija was not escaping from the scene
of a crime of violence; no officer or other witness had seen a weapon; at the time
Mullenix fired his rifle, most officers and bystanders were miles away; Leija could
not have encountered any officers until after the spike strips had the opportunity
to stop the chase; Mullenix was not aware of the officers’ positions below the overpass; officers were trained to set up the spikes in a location where they could find a
position for their protection and as trained, the officer who set up the spike strips
was behind a pillar; and in replying to a deputy, Mullenix did not indicate that he
perceived Leija to pose any threat to an officer standing beneath the overpass. Id.
at 723.
222. Id. at 724.
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had heard the warning that Leija had a weapon six minutes before
he shot his rifle and had time to ask for his supervisor’s opinion, to
inform another officer of his intention to shoot, and to discuss the
feasibility of shooting with a third officer.223 None of the other officers involved in the pursuit, similarly aware of Leija’s threats, concluded that deadly force was necessary or justified.224 To the
contrary, Mullenix’s supervisor advised Mullenix to stand by until
Leija’s car crossed the spike strips.225
The court of appeals next turned to the issue of qualified immunity. The court acknowledged that in assessing immunity, it was
required to be attentive to the particular facts giving rise to Mullenix’s decision to shoot.226 The court noted that to be clearly established the “reasonable official would understand that what he is
doing violates that right”;227 “prior decisions gave reasonable warning that the conduct then at issue violated constitutional rights”;228
and that the court was to define the right “in the specific context of
the case.”229 While accepting the mandate to apply the immunity
test through a fact-specific lens, the court of appeals noted that it
could be clearly established that Mullenix’s use of force was constitutionally unreasonable “despite notable factual distinctions between the precedents relied on and [Mullenix’s shooting], so long as
the prior decisions gave reasonable warning that the conduct then
at issue violated constitutional rights.”230
The court of appeals found that at the time Mullenix killed
Leija, precedents clearly established that it was unreasonable to use
deadly force to apprehend a fleeing felon absent a risk of harm to
the officer or others—not only as a general proposition—but “in
the more specific context of shooting a suspect fleeing in a motor
vehicle.”231 The court distinguished Supreme Court and courts of
appeal cases that had immunized officials sued for using deadly
force to stop a vehicle. In those cases, the court observed, the highspeed chase endangered officers and nearby bystanders.232 In arriving at its conclusion that Mullenix’s decision to shoot at Lejia’s car
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id. The court further observed that there was no evidence it was feasible
to immediately disable Lejia’s car by shooting at the engine.
226. Luna, 773 F.3d at 724–25.
227. Id. at 724 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)).
228. Id. at 724 (quoting Kinney v. Weaver, 367 F.3d 337, 350 (5th Cir. 2014)).
229. Id. (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)).
230. Id. (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 740 (2002)).
231. Id. at 725.
232. Id.

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\126-3\DIK303.txt

2022]

THE NEUROSCIENCE

unknown

OF

Seq: 37

QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

5-MAY-22

9:30

805

was unreasonable, the court had already detailed why Leija posed
no substantial or immediate threat to officers or others when Mullenix chose to fire his rifle.233 Accordingly, the court concluded,
Mullenix violated Leija’s clearly established Fourth Amendment
rights.234
The Supreme Court summarily reversed.235 Its per curiam decision is a playbook for defense counsel asserting qualified immunity
and a warning to courts entertaining the thought of denying immunity. First, while the court of appeals had referenced the “fair notice” standard the Court had proffered in Hope v. Pelzer,236 the
Mullenix Court reiterated the more demanding tests of factual
proximity.237 Ignoring the fact-intensive inquiry that the Fifth Circuit had acknowledged and utilized, the Court concluded that the
court of appeals conducted its assessment of whether Leija posed
an actionable threat of harm to officers or bystanders at too high a
level of generality.238
In comparing the Mullenix facts to the facts of the precedents,
the Court sanctioned a second strategy for finding that prior cases
did not clearly establish the right at stake. Even though the evidence was required to be viewed in the light most favorable to
Leija, the Court did not attempt to grapple with all the ways in
which the court of appeals expressly found Leija posed a significantly less (or non-existent) threat to officers or bystanders compared to the fleeing suspects in the precedent cases. Instead, the
Court extricated individual aspects of Leija’s flight that—viewed in
isolation—theoretically posed a greater risk of harm than in the
precedent cases.239
In Brosseau v. Haugen,240 the Court had reversed the denial of
immunity to Officer Brosseau, who, after responding to a report of
a fight in the yard of Haugen’s mother’s house, ran after a fleeing
Haugen.241 Haugen jumped into his Jeep that was parked in his
mother’s driveway.242 Brosseau believed Haugen was trying to get a
weapon.243 Haugen ignored repeated instructions at gunpoint to get
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.

Id. at 719–21.
Id. at 725.
Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7 (2015).
Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S 730, 740 (2002).
See supra notes 177–86 and accompanying text.
Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 12–13.
Id. at 14–15.
Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194 (2004) (per curiam).
Id. at 195–96.
Id. at 196.
Id.
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out of the car.244 Brosseau struck and shattered the driver’s side
window with her handgun, unsuccessfully tried to grab the keys to
the truck, and struck Haugen on the head with her gun.245 After
Haugen started the Jeep—or just after it began to move—Brosseau
jumped back and fired one shot at Haugen.246 She feared for the
safety of: 1) other officers who she believed were on foot in the
immediate area, including officers who were on the scene when
Brosseau arrived as well as officers who responded to her request
for assistance; 2) vehicles in Haugen’s path, including the car occupied by Haugen’s girlfriend and her three-year-old daughter that
was parked four feet in front of the Jeep; and 3) other citizens who
may be in the area of Hagen’s mother’s house.247
The Supreme Court found Brosseau supported reversal of the
court of appeals’ denial of summary judgment to Mullenix.248 The
Mullenix Court could have pointed to the countless ways in which
Haugen presented a significantly greater risk of harm than Leija.249
Instead, the Court construed the single fact that Haugen had just
begun driving off when shot to be less risky than the fact that Leija
had been leading police on a high-speed chase for 24 miles, was
reportedly intoxicated, and had threatened to shoot officers.250 Yet
the court of appeals had considered these same facts—not in isolation but in the context of the actual encounter (including Mullenix’s
superior officer’s instruction not to shoot before giving the spike
strips a chance to work)—to justifiably conclude that at the time of
the shooting, Leija posed no risk of harm to anyone.251 If Mullenix
is representative of the prescriptive immunity analysis,252 then any
time a court dissects a constitutional violation and abstracts one or
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 196–97.
247. Id. at 197.
248. Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 14.
249. The Court, ignoring the articulated reasoning in Brosseau, inexplicably
considered Haugen to have been “headed only in the general direction of officers
and bystanders.” Id.
250. Id.
251. Luna v. Mullenix, 773 F.3d 712, 719–23 (2014).
252. The Mullenix Court employed the same modus operandi in finding that
its decisions in Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007) and Plumhoff v. Rickard, 472
U.S. 765 (2014) did not clearly establish that Mullenix’s use of deadly force was
unconstitutional. While acknowledging that Leija posed a lesser (or more accurately, non-existent) danger to other cars than the fleeing suspects in those cases,
the Court reasoned that the fugitives in those cases (1) had not verbally threatened
to kill officers (as the court of appeals had noted, none of the other officers involved in the pursuit—including Mullenix’s superior—who were aware of Leija’s
threats determined that deadly force was necessary or justified) and (2) were not
about to come upon other officers (officers who the court of appeals found, consis-
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more out-of-context facts out of the government-citizen encounter
that are more ominous than analogous facts in the precedent cases,
the right will not be clearly established.253
The Supreme Court endorsed a third means of arguing/finding
that prior decisions fail to clearly establish a right. The Court discredited the court of appeals’ reliance on the fact that when Mullenix made the unilateral, unauthorized, untrained, and untried
decision to shoot, protocols were already in place to stop Leija’s
car.254 The Canyon Police Department, its officers deployed to the
scene, and Mullenix’s superior all concluded that the spike strips
were the appropriate means of stopping Leija’s fleeing car.255 The
officers from the Texas Department of Public Safety who were leading the pursuit of Leija on I-27 saw no need to intervene before
Leija drove over the spike strips. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court
drew upon the amicus brief filed by the National Association of
Police Organizations (NAPO) on the fallibility of and dangers
posed by spike strips.256 There was no evidence that Mullenix was
privy to or relied upon that association’s view of spike strips. Yet,
the Court invoked NAPO’s opinion that spike strips are dangerous
and then reasoned that no case had denied immunity because the
officer selected one dangerous alternative to stopping a chase over
another.257 Accordingly, the Court held that the court of appeals
erred in denying immunity because the precedents did not “place
tent with their training, had taken a protective position after setting the spike
strips, and Mullenix had no information to the contrary).
253. The Mullenix Court utilized the same technique in concluding that lower
court cases decided after Brosseau did not clearly establish the unconstitutionality
of Mullenix’s shooting. Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 16–17. In her dissent, JUSTICE
SOTOMAYOR observed that the majority’s parsing of individual facts was a “red
herring,” disguising the inarguable reality that Mullenix could articulate no interest
in shooting at Lejia’s car before it ran over the spike strips. Id. at 24–25
(SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting). JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR concluded that the Court’s
opinion supported a culture of “shoot first, think later” that “renders the protections of the Fourth Amendment hollow.” Id. at 26.
254. Id. at 20–21 (SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting).
255. Id.
256. The Court also cited a) a Fifth Circuit case conferring immunity on an
officer who shot a fleeing driver after the driver had avoided road spikes, Thompson v. Mercer, 762 F.3d 433 (5th Cir. 2014); and b) a Tenth Circuit case affirming
the immunity of an officer who shot at the driver of a stolen truck after it had twice
driven off the road to avoid spike strips, and the officer had set a third set of strips
assuming the driver, to again avoid the strips, would cease driving the wrong way
on the highway, Cordova v. Aragon, 569 F.3d 1183 (10th Cir. 2009). In neither case
did the court of appeals conclude the spike strips posed a danger or rely upon such
a danger to justify the shooting.
257. Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 15.
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the conclusion that [Mullenix] acted unreasonably ‘beyond
debate.’”258
In light of Mullenix, defense counsel is well-advised to research, solicit, and present to the court extrinsic evidence from
sources outside the officer’s department or chain of command that
justify one or more aspects of the officials’ unconstitutional behavior. Though it may not have been relied upon by the official—and
even if contrary to the departmental policies, training, and instruction that were in place to guide the officer’s actions—such evidence
can introduce facts that will be used to distinguish otherwise-analogous precedents.259
The Supreme Court’s repeated per curiam reversals of denials
of immunity have sent a clarion call to lower courts: deny immunity
at your peril. As Judge Reeves, the keynote speaker at this Symposium, offered:
No one wants to be reversed by the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court’s summary reversals of qualified immunity cases are
ever-more biting. If you’ve been a Circuit Judge since 1979—sitting on the bench longer than any current Justice—you might expect a more forgiving reversal. Other appellate judges see these
decisions, read the tea leaves, and realize it is safer to find debatable whether it was a clearly established constitutional violation
. . . .260

Professor Alexander Reinert’s review of over 4,000 appellate
decisions issued from 2004 to 2015 supports Judge Reeves’ reading
of the likely effect of the Supreme Court’s message.261 In what Prof.
Reinert terms “asymmetric review,” the data shows that: a) courts
of appeals are far more likely to uphold lower court rulings granting
immunity than rulings denying immunity; and b) courts of appeals
reversed district court decisions that denied immunity far more frequently than reversing district court grants of immunity, resulting in
defendants succeeding on their immunity claim in 61 percent of appeals while plaintiffs succeeded in fending off immunity in only 30
percent of appeals.262
By its own admission, the Court’s rulings on when a right is
clearly established protect “all but the plainly incompetent or those
258. Id. at 16.
259. By contrast, the Court has precluded the victim from offering evidence
extrinsic to cases interpreting the federal constitutional right to defeat immunity.
See supra notes 138–45 and accompanying text.
260. Jamison v. McClendon, 476 F. Supp. 3d 386, 408 (S.D. Miss. 2020).
261. See generally Reinert, supra note 188.
262. Id. at 26.
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who knowingly violate the law.”263 The Court’s reckoning of the
generous shield its decisions confer understates the behaviors immunity protects. As demonstrated by Mullenix, immunity shelters a
plainly incompetent police officer from liability for killing a citizen.
And even when the official knows they are violating the Constitution, their lawyer can rescue them from accountability by unearthing fact distinctions from prior cases and soliciting and presenting
evidence that was unknown to, much less relied upon, by the
official.
The current qualified immunity standard is founded exclusively
in the Court’s policy prescription that preserving socially desirable
decision-making requires freeing government officials from bearing
the costs of their unconstitutional acts. Thus, in evaluating the current legal test for immunity it is appropriate to: a) identify the
Court’s assumptions as to the mental process by which officials
make the decisions that the Court has declared to merit immunity;
and b) test those hypotheses against the current scientific consensus
as to the working of the brain.
III. TESTING THE SUPREME COURT’S ASSUMPTIONS AS
THE HUMAN BRAIN MAKES DECISIONS AGAINST
CONTEMPORARY NEUROSCIENCE

TO

HOW

The Supreme Court never explicitly articulated the thought
process precipitating the actions of officials that the Court’s immunity test is designed to encourage and insulate from accountability.
Yet, the Court has implicitly relied on a theory of how the human
brain works when it repeatedly reformulated the common law test
for qualified immunity. This Article will now unpack the unstated
assumptions, analyze whether the Court’s view of how the brain
operates is supported by contemporary understandings of neuroscience and neurobiology, and propose how the present conditions
for immunity should be modified to be congruent with the workings
of the brain.
A. Assumptions Underlying the Court’s Abrogation of the
Subjective Prong of Immunity
The Court’s rescission of the requirement that the government
actor must subjectively act in good faith to be immune rests upon
the expectation that the rational processes of the brain will override
263. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).
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the emotional impulses of the official.264 In Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
the Court accepted that “the judgments surrounding discretionary
action almost inevitably are influenced by the decisionmaker’s experiences, values, and emotions.”265 Nonetheless, the Harlow Court
theorized that, even when harboring ill-will towards the citizen, the
official would “be made to hesitate” where they “could be expected
to know that [the] conduct would violate . . . constitutional
rights.”266 The Court had faith that even when emotionally intent
on causing harm, the official would refrain from exercising discretion if the rational processes of the brain concluded that to do so
would transgress a clearly established right.
B. Testing the Assumptions Underlying Abrogation of the
Subjective Prong of Immunity Against Neuroscientific
Findings as to the Role of Emotion in the Working
of the Brain
The Harlow Court’s parsing of decision-making into separate
emotional and rational spheres is consonant with the conception of
the Triune Brain propounded in the 1960s by neuroscientist Paul
MacLean.267 MacLean posited that through evolution, the brain developed three structures, each with separate and increasingly more
sophisticated abilities.268 The earliest, primitive brain—the reptilian
or lizard brain—acts by reflex to control survival functions such as
breathing and heart rate.269 The next portion of the brain to evolve,
the limbic system, processes and uses emotion to guide the body’s
reaction.270 The neocortex—the most recent and most highly developed part of the brain—has the capacity to perform the executive
functions we associate with rationality.271
Anatomically, the Triune Brain buttresses the notion that emotion and reason are wholly separate functions of the brain, engaged
in a battle to dictate the body’s actions. Emanating from the less264. See generally Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) (rescinding the
requirement of subjective good faith in qualified immunity cases).
265. Id. at 816 (emphasis added).
266. Id. at 819.
267. See generally PAUL D. MACLEAN, THE TRIUNE BRAIN IN EVOLUTION:
ROLE IN PALEOCEREBRAL FUNCTIONS (1990). Leonard Mlodinow attributes the
roots of this theory to Charles Darwin’s The Expression of Emotions in Man and
Animal, and the popularization of the triune model to Carl Sagan’s The Dragon of
Eden and Daniel Goleman’s Emotional Intelligence. MLODINOW, supra note 6, at
17.
268. MACLEAN, supra note 267, at 15–18.
269. Id. at 15–16.
270. Id. at 16–17.
271. Id. at 17–18.
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evolved portion of the brain, the theory posits, “emotions are part
of an inherent animal nature and cause us to perform foolish and
even violent acts unless we control them through our rational
thoughts.”272 The baseline of the American legal system—stare decisis—is premised on this traditional, longstanding view of emotion
and reason.273 It is unsurprising, then, that the Supreme Court believed that the rational operation of the government agent’s neocortex would overcome the emotional impulses that, unrestrained,
would set in motion the official’s intention to deprive the citizen of
their constitutionally guaranteed liberties.
The technological revolution in witnessing the workings of the
brain has spawned an accompanying “revolution in our understanding of human feelings.”274 Three questions are critical to assessing
the validity of the assumption underlying the Court’s abrogation of
the subjective good faith prerequisite to immunity: 1) What constitutes emotions; 2) How do emotions interact with the cognitive
processes of the brain; and 3) What degree of influence do emotions exert on the brain’s communication to the body to act.
1. What Constitutes Emotions
Emotions are what we experience and perceive in response to
the body’s internal signals to the brain. In a constant process known
as interoception, the brain receives a steady stream of transmissions
from our “internal organs and tissues, the hormones in [our] blood,
and [our] immune system.”275 The brain remains continuously alert
to disruptions to homeostasis, the heathy state of the body’s internal condition. Unsurprisingly, that interior condition is affected by
stimuli external to the body, including our reactions to the persons
with whom we are interacting.276
Emotion is the concept or label we have assigned to the feeling
we perceive from “affect:” the brain’s response to the body’s internal signals.277 That feeling is a combination of two variables: 1) valence—pleasantness or unpleasantness; and 2) arousal—the
magnitude or intensity of the response, such as the degree of calm
or agitation.278
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.

BARRETT, supra note 7, at xii.
Id.
MLODINOW, supra note 6, at xii.
BARRETT, supra note 7, at 56.
Id. at 71.
MLODINOW supra note 6, at 45–46.
Id. at 43; BARRETT, supra note 7, at 74.
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2. How Emotions Interact with the Cognitive Processes of the
Brain
As noted earlier, the Triune Brain divides the mind into three
autonomous layers, with the neocortex recognized as the most
evolved and dominant driver of rational decision-making. The view
that there are three independently operating segments of the brain
“remains one of the most successful misconceptions in human biology.”279 For the neurons in each of the three parts of the Triune
Brain do not merely function in isolation, but are intertwined and
communicate reciprocally with one another.280 “We now know that
emotion is profoundly integrated into the neural circuits of our
brains, inseparable from our circuits for ‘rational’ thought.”281 Accordingly, the decision to act is never determined solely by the rational output of the neocortex. Rather, the brain invariably
considers the constant current of internal signals concerning the
body’s needs—disruptions in the beating of the heart, changes in
blood pressure, demands for oxygen by the lungs, and requests for
added glucose.282 Affect—the response to these signals—is “irrevocably woven into the fabric of every decision.”283
3. What Degree of Influence Do Emotions Exert on the Brain’s
Communication to the Body to Act
Not only is emotion a constituent part of every choice, but contrary to the view that we are rational actors, emotion exerts the
greatest sway over decision-making. The continuous process of interoception is the brain’s “most important mission,” reacting to disruptions in the body’s internal state “so you can stay alive and
well.”284 Affect—the response to cues as to that internal state—
“reflects whether the homeostatic state of the body and its current
external circumstance is conducive to survival.”285 Emotion is “the
body’s way of saying, ‘Hey, something really important is going
on,’” generating a response before the brain has fully processed the
situation.286 Accordingly, our higher order thinking skills do not
suppress the desires generated by emotion; rather, “[a]ffect is in the
driver’s seat and rationality is a passenger.”287
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.

BARRETT, supra note 7, at 81.
Id. at 22; SAPOLSKY, supra note 9, at 23, 25.
MLODINOW, supra note 6, at 23.
BARRETT, supra note 7, at 66, 73.
BARRETT, supra note 7, at 80.
Id. at 66.
MLODINOW, supra note 6, at 46.
TALI SHAROT, THE INFLUENTIAL MIND 40–41 (2017).
BARRETT, supra note 7, at 80.
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The modern discoveries on the role that emotion plays in the
brain’s decision-making are squarely opposite to the Court’s supposition when it eliminated subjective good-faith as a prerequisite to
qualified immunity. The Court presumed the public official’s rational assessment of whether a contemplated action will violate the
Constitution would override their emotional investment in harming
the citizen.288 Instead, those emotions will play a signature role in
how the government agent chooses to exercise their discretion, and
likely will be the most significant driver of the decision that deprives the citizen of their constitutional rights. Any anger the Florida Highway Patrol officials harbored over Scherer’s refusal to
follow their orders to quit his part-time deputy position necessarily
played an animating role in their election to fire Scherer without
affording him the protections required by the Procedural Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.289 Mullenix’s motivation to disprove his supervisor’s critique that Mullenix was
insufficiently proactive inescapably played a leading role in his decision to fire the six shots that killed Leija.290 By excising good-faith
as a necessary condition for immunity, the Court detached its test
from the reality of governmental decision-making that the doctrine
is designed to protect.
C. Reforming the Court’s Abrogation of the Subjective Prong of
Immunity to be Congruent with the Neuroscience of
Governmental Decision-Making
Because emotion unavoidably plays a significant role in how
government agents exercise their discretion, subjective good faith
should be restored as a prerequisite to qualified immunity. Divesting the official of immunity when they intend to harm the citizen
will not disrupt the policy goal of protecting blameless action from
liability. To the contrary, immunizing the official whose brain’s signal to act was principally influenced by their motivation to harm the
citizen would insulate the official from accountability for the most
opprobrious conduct.
Demanding that the officer act in good faith to be immune
would not undermine the policy goal of carving added space for the
appropriate exercise of discretion that the doctrine of immunity is
designed to preserve. But the Court’s retraction of the subjective
good-faith requirement was animated by an added policy concern—
288. See supra notes 264–66 and accompanying text.
289. See supra notes 127–28 and accompanying text.
290. See supra note 211 and accompanying text.
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the Court’s perception that public officials and society needed to be
freed from the costs attendant to litigation.291 The Court believed
that the issue of the official’s intent, as a classic issue of fact, prevented defendants from succeeding on motions for summary judgment asserting qualified immunity. As Justice Kennedy recognized,
developments after Harlow facilitated grants of summary judgment
where intent was an element:
Harlow was decided at a time when the standards applicable to
summary judgment made it difficult for a defendant to secure
summary judgment regarding a factual question such as subjective intent, even when the plaintiff bore the burden of proof on
the question; and in Harlow we relied on that fact in adopting an
objective standard for qualified immunity. However, subsequent
clarifications to summary-judgment law have alleviated that
problem, by allowing summary judgment to be entered against a
non-moving party “who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element necessary to that party’s case,
and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.”
Under the principles set forth in Celotex and related cases, the
strength of factual allegations such as subjective bad faith can be
tested at the summary-judgment stage.292

As the issue of the official’s intent no longer precludes dismissal of cases on summary judgment, the lone social cost of litigation
that would be incurred by restoration of subjective good faith as an
element of immunity is the discovery that occurs before filing the
motion for summary judgment. The available empirical evidence
did not support the Harlow Court’s surmise that discovery in constitutional tort actions was widespread and disruptive.293 Equally importantly, rectifying the Court’s error in assuming that reason
would overcome the emotion underlying the official’s intent to
harm the citizen alters the outcome of what the Harlow Court
deemed the “balance between the evils in any available alternative”
when it crafted a new test for qualified immunity.294 On one side of
the balance, as the Harlow Court recognized, “[i]n situations of
abuse of office, an action for damages may offer the only realistic
avenue for vindication of constitutional guarantees.”295 The neuroscientific discovery as to the preeminent sway of emotion makes it
291. See supra notes 115–17 and accompanying text.
292. Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 171 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815–19 (1982); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 322 (1986)).
293. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
294. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 813 (1982).
295. Id.
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more probable that invasions of constitutional rights will occur
where the official harbors ill-will towards the citizen. Subsequent
decisions of the Court have removed from the government’s side of
the scale the concern that Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure precludes disposition of the issue of good faith on motions for summary judgment.296 Consequently, the balance of the
“evils available in any alternative” now plainly tips in favor of requiring the official to have acted in good faith in order to be exempted from accountability for damages when they deprive a
citizen of their constitutional rights.297
D. Assumptions Underlying the Court’s Reformulation of the
Objective Test for Immunity
The current objective test of qualified immunity exonerates
public officials on the ground that although their actions violated
the Constitution, the officials’ belief that they acted in accordance
with constitutional norms nonetheless was reasonable.298 The Court
has supposed that the officer can harbor a reasonable belief that
exercising their discretion is appropriate even where acting on that
belief is objectively negligent,299 reckless,300 deliberately indiffer296. See, e.g., Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 169–76 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
297. Justice Blackmun responded to proposals to relieve another social cost of
litigation in civil liberties actions—the rising number of Section 1983 actions on the
dockets of the federal courts—as follows:
If critics are concerned by the sheer burden placed on the federal judiciary by § 1983 actions, they might do well to turn their attention, too, to
other sources of federal litigation. My point is simply that if we want to
nominate a particular group of cases for exclusion from the federal
courts, we should look first at groups in which federal law is not sensitively at issue rather than at one in which fundamental constitutional
rights are at stake.
Hon. Harry A. Blackmun, Section 1983 and Federal Protection of Individual
Rights—Will the Statute Remain Alive or Fade Away? 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 21
(1985). To parrot Justice Blackmun’s words, if we want to nominate a particular
group of cases for exclusion from discovery in federal courts, we should look first
at claims against government officials where fundamental constitutional rights are
not at stake.
298. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 206 (2001).
299. Graham v. O’Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989) (explaining that the test
for when use of force violates Fourth Amendment is “whether the officers’ actions
are ‘objectively unreasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances confronting
them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation”); Brinegar v.
United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949) (“Probable cause exists where ‘the facts
and circumstances within their [the officers’] knowledge and of which they had
reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man
of reasonable caution in the belief that’ an offense has been or is being committed.”) (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)).
300. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 334 n.3 (1986) (holding that negligent
conduct does not constitute a “deprivation” of procedural due process within the
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ent,301 and even conscience shocking.302 Under the Court’s reworked immunity standard, the official will reasonably believe their
intended action is constitutional unless and until the right imperiled
was so clearly established under the facts presented that “every reasonable official would have understood that what he is [proposing
to do] violates that right.”303
Under the test for immunity it set forth, the Court assumes the
brain of the public official will arrive at the belief that their contemplated conduct will not trammel the constitutionally guaranteed
rights of the citizen through the following cognitive process.
First, the official will consider relevant case precedents interpreting the federal constitutional right at stake in assessing whether
their proposed course of action will violate the Constitution.304
Second, the official will conclude that their intended action satisfies the Constitution unless those precedents establish “beyond
debate” that, under the specific facts, the proposed course of conduct is unconstitutional.305
Third, the official will not consider whether state constitutional
provisions, state statutes, state administrative regulations, departmental policy, the officer’s training, and orders from their superiors—viewed in concert with precedents interpreting the federal
right—should lead them to believe the proposed action is
unconstitutional.306
Fourth, if under the precedent-only based assessment it is not
clearly established that their contemplated actions are unconstitumeaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, reserving resolution of whether recklessness or gross negligence amounts to a “deprivation”); Davidson v. Cannon, 474
U.S. 344, 358 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (opining that reckless or deliberate
indifference would establish “deprivation” under the Due Process Clause).
301. See generally Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994) (finding that the
failure of prison authorities to protect a transgender inmate from sexual assault
violates Eighth Amendment where inaction was reckless as defined by criminal
law). See also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (requiring a prisoner to prove
“deliberate indifference to serious medical needs” to establish a violation of Eight
Amendment).
302. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846–47 (1998) (rejecting
the deliberate indifference standard and holding that only governmental actions
that shock the conscience invade the substantive guarantees of the Due Process
Clause); see also Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 128–29 (1992)
(finding that the substantive Due Process guarantees of Fourteenth Amendment
are violated only where the conduct is arbitrary or shocks the conscience).
303. Reichle v. Howard, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012).
304. See supra Part II(B)(6)(a).
305. See supra Part II(B)(6)(b); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011).
306. See supra Part II(B)(6)(a).
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tional, the brain of the official will signal the official to proceed with
the intended action.307
Fifth, the brain will instruct the official to take the considered
action even if the brain does not believe it to be the approved, correct, or desirable course of action in light of all the authorities (case
precedents about the federal right, the state constitution, state statutes, state administrative regulations, departmental policy, the officer’s training, and orders from their superiors) bearing upon its
lawfulness.308 The official’s brain will reason that the official should
proceed with the contemplated course of conduct because they will
not risk liability for depriving the citizen of their constitutional
rights—even though the official may be liable for damages caused
by their violation of state law and may be subjected to internal discipline for acting contrary to applicable policy, training, or orders.
Put another way, if the constitutional right endangered is not
clearly established, the brain will order the official to act even
where other guardrails on their authority—accounted for in concert
with or independent of the Constitution—signal the intended action
is wrong.
E. Testing the Assumptions Underlying the Court’s
Reformulation of the Objective Test for Immunity
Against Neuroscientific Findings as to the Rational
Working of the Brain
The Court’s adoption and application of the clearly established
right standard presumes that the neo-cortex of the official will engage executive functions akin to those used by judges and lawyers.309 Government agents will estimate the foreseeability that
their contemplated action will violate the federal constitution separate from an evaluation of whether the action is proscribed by other
authorities and directives. In determining whether the intended exercise of discretion risks depriving the citizen of a clearly established right, the official will engage in the granular process of
analogizing and distinguishing the facts of their current situation
against those presented in the relevant precedent cases.310 If the
official concludes that acting will not impinge upon a right that is
clearly established under the particular facts they confront, the offi307. See supra Part II(B)(6)(b).
308. See supra Part II(B)(6)(a)–(b).
309. See SAPOLSKY, supra note 9, at 48. (“The frontal cortex also mediates
‘executive functions’—considering bits of information, looking for patterns, and
then choosing a strategic action.”).
310. See supra Part II(B)(6)(b).
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cial will proceed with the intended course of action, concluding that
to do so does not foreseeably risk personal liability—at least as to
violations of the United States Constitution.
Unlike the erroneous presumption of the Court that reason
can and will conquer the insidious influence of emotion emanating
from a separate part of the brain, the neo-cortex does have the ability to conduct the analytical steps the Court presumes the official
will undertake. While the brain is capable of that analysis, the
Court’s hypothesis nonetheless contravenes the way in which the
mind of the official actually will reach a decision to act. To understand why the official will not reason as the Court inferred, it is
necessary to understand four central features of the construct of the
brain.
First the brain consists of billions of neurons, encased in the
opaque box of the skull. These neurons cannot see, hear, taste, or
feel. Rather they receive and interpret signals from what the senses
of sight, sound, smell, and touch detect outside the body and, as
previously discussed, communications emanating from inside the
body.311
Second, the neurons of the brain are not prewired.312 There is
no cohort of neurons genetically assigned to receive, store, and access information from case precedents interpreting provisions of the
United States Constitution. Rather, our experiences create the neural architecture of our brain.313
The individual neurons in the brain create networks that are
formed as a result of the events in our life. Inputs that, based on
past encounters, are found to be relevant and valuable are transmitted more readily from the ears to the mouth of a single neuron, and
more quickly across the synapse between neurons.314 As the brain
identifies multiple signals that co-occur in an event, the various
neurons transmitting those signals form a network, communicating
with one another.315 The more frequent the instances in which
those inputs recur together, the stronger and faster the communication is between the neurons in that network. Hebb’s law, summarizing the finding of a Canadian neurobiologist Donald Hebb, states
that “neurons that fire together wire together.”316
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.

See BARRETT, supra note 7, at 58–59.
See SAPOLSKY, supra note 9, at 689–90.
See BARRETT, supra note 7, at 28, 34.
See SAPOLSKY, supra note 9, at 687, 694.
Id. at 700–01.
Id. at 138.
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Third, to make sense of the signals it receives from outside the
body, the brain conducts a Google search of its database, looking
for the highest ranked match to these inputs.317 The brain’s
database is not a law library, Lexis, Westlaw, or compendium of
cases interpreting the United States Constitution. Rather, the
database is the past life experience of the perceiver, embodied in
the neural networks that were formed by the coinciding of inputs.
Based upon its search of the experiential database, the brain will
predict what the incoming signals mean and dictate the body’s appropriate response. In arriving at its prediction, the brain’s algorithm assigns the highest rank to the pattern of experience that
most resembles the present situation.318 Because the neural networks are strengthened as an experience is repeated, events that
have recurred with greater frequency are assigned greater weight in
ordering the results of the search.
Fourth, this process of pattern matching takes place, constantly, automatically, invisibly, and subconsciously.319 Once the
brain finds that what is presently occurring sufficiently resembles
past experience, it will instantaneously signal the body to act on
that prediction.320 The brain will immediately issue its instruction to
act even though there is a possibility of error that could be minimized if the mind paused and took time to consider contradictory
data and alternate explanations.
The brain homed its capacity to make instantaneous decisions
both to ensure our survival and to efficiently allocate its finite supply of energy. Every second, the brain receives as much data from
the retina of the eye alone as in a complete computer network.321
Therefore, it must constantly sift for what is, and is not, relevant.
Utilizing the higher analytical powers of the brain draws heavily on the body’s glucose supply.322 When the brain has found a
sufficient resemblance to past experience to predict what it is perceiving and how to respond, to engage in further thought would be
time-consuming and a wasteful expenditure of energy that could be
better allocated to address the body’s true needs.
The cognitive psychologist Daniel Kahneman captured this operation of the mind in his seminal Thinking Fast and Slow.323 Bor317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.

See BARRETT, supra note 7, at 59.
Id. at 117.
Id. at 26, 125.
Id. at 60.
Id.
DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING FAST
See id. at 44.

AND

SLOW 43 (2011).

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\126-3\DIK303.txt

820

unknown

Seq: 52

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

5-MAY-22

9:30

[Vol. 126:769

rowing the terms first coined by psychologists Keith Stanovick and
Richard West,324 Kahneman depicted the fast operation of the
brain as System 1 and the slower operation of brain as System 2.
The processes of System 2 will be familiar to those trained in
legal analysis. System 2 “follow[s] rules, compare[s] objects on several attributes, and make[s] deliberate choices between options.”325
It “can construct thoughts in an orderly series of steps”326 and
“[c]heck the validity of a complex logical argument.”327
While System 2 engages in conscious reasoning,328 System 1
operates quickly, automatically, and constantly, without voluntary
control or effort.329 System 1 instantaneously seeks to associate incoming signals of perception with a pattern from past experience.
When System 1 finds what it is perceiving sufficiently resembles
something that has occurred in the past, it concludes that it has accurately detected what is happening, shuts out any contradictory
input, and notifies the body to respond.330
While not anatomically separate parts of the brain, System 1
and System 2 function both independently and interdependently.
System 2 will not unnecessarily exert the expensive effort required
to engage its mental activity. Therefore, where the cognitively efficient operation of System 1 discovers that what is taking place is
sufficiently similar to the user’s past experience, System 2 will uncritically accept that interpretation and the proffered solution.331
System 2 remains dormant, activated only where System 1 cannot
find a past pattern that adequately matches the present situation.332
None of the five attributes of official decision-making that underpin the Court’s reimagination of the objective immunity standard square with the operation of the brain. When called upon to
decide whether to exercise discretion, the government agent’s brain
will not conduct a discrete, System 2 assessment of constitutionality
by comparing and contrasting the facts presented to the facts of applicable precedents interpreting the federal right in issue. Rather,
System 1 of the official’s mind will automatically search the neural
networks created from the government agent’s experience for resemblance to the instant situation. All inputs relevant to those past
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.

Id. at 20.
Id. at 36.
Id. at 21.
Id. at 22.
Id. at 21.
Id. at 20–21, 24.
Id. at 58, 73, 80, 81.
Id. at 24, 64.
KAHNEMAN, supra note 322, at 24.
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instances will form an integrated part of the neural networks associated with the event—not only court cases alone but also guidance
from state constitutional and statutory law, state administrative regulations, policies, training manuals and programs, orders from
superiors, and the official’s on-the-job history. Where the fast, subconscious, invisible operation of the brain finds that the present situation sufficiently resembles past experience, the official will act or
refrain from acting accordingly. If the integrated neural network of
precedents, state law, internal policies, training, and/or instructions
from their superior formed from the officer’s past experiences collectively cause System 1 to predict that taking action is inappropriate, System 2 will not waste energy analyzing whether acting
nonetheless might not violate a clearly established federal constitutional right.333
Even were we to wrongly assume that the official’s brain will
conduct an isolated and independent review of precedents, the
Court was mistaken in concluding that the official will believe their
proposed action is constitutional unless there is a prior case that is
so close factually that every official would recognize that the Constitution prohibited the act. The Court presumes that, upon finding
no pattern of unconstitutionality in the caselaw, the brain will cease
searching for other resemblances to the current situation. To the
contrary, the mind is constantly, invisibly, and automatically looking for the “winning instance”334 emerging from its comparison of
current inputs to the database of experience. If cases interpreting
the Constitution do not supply a pattern that determines how to act,
the brain will continue to search for other experiential matches that
will best predict what is happening outside the brain and determine
how to respond. Contrary to the Court’s assumption, the mind will
not leap from “I see no experience from cases interpreting the Constitution” to “I believe it is appropriate to act.” Rather, the brain
searches for a pattern from the entirety of its database of past occurrences, with all authorities and instructions that have a bearing
on the proper way to act under the circumstances contributing to
the neural network.
The Court’s current immunity test was not proven in a neuroscience lab but was concocted in its chambers. Interestingly, the
333. The Court has been particularly deferential to police officers’ use of
force when making “split-second judgments.” Graham v. O’Connor, 490 U.S. 386,
397 (1989). In such instances, it is even less likely that the brain of the official will
be scanning for factually identical precedents. To the contrary, where there is a call
for immediate action, System 1 thinking must and will animate action without activation of System 2 processes.
334. BARRETT, supra note 7, at 112–13.

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\126-3\DIK303.txt

822

unknown

Seq: 54

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

5-MAY-22

9:30

[Vol. 126:769

prior iterations of the Court’s test contradict the assumptions as to
the workings of the mind that undergird the present standard. The
Court’s initial recognition of qualified immunity rested upon a very
different understanding of the mental process preceding governmental action. The Pierson Court found it unacceptable to hold police officers strictly accountable because it assumed that in forming
the belief that it was constitutionally appropriate to arrest the Freedom Riders, they would consider and did consider state law, which
in that case was a Mississippi statute that authorized the arrest of
the Freedom Riders if they caused a breach of the peace.335 The
Court’s expansion of the test for immunity in Scheuer v. Rhodes
likewise presumed the brain of the public official would consider all
inputs bearing on the lawfulness of their proposed conduct—not
solely caselaw about the federal right—in formulating a belief as to
the propriety of their contemplated act. The Court proffered that
the officials’ belief that acting was lawful would be formed after
considering state laws defining their duties and discretion and, for
subordinate officials, the orders of their superiors.336
Only after sua sponte interjecting the concept of “clearly established rights” into the immunity test337 did the Court pivot to a different hypothesis as to the workings of the official brain. In Davis v.
Scherer, the Court assumed that in arriving at the belief that firing
Scherer without affording additional notice and an opportunity to
be heard would be constitutional, the Florida Highway Patrol officials would not have considered procedures unambiguously mandated by state regulations issued two months before the firing as
well as the Attorney General’s opinion issued two years earlier.338
The Court’s per curiam opinion in Mullenix v. Luna similarly assumed that Officer Mullenix’s belief that it was appropriate to
shoot at Leija’s car was solely the product of comparing his situation to the facts of prior federal court cases on the constitutionality
of use of deadly force. The Court further accepted that once believing that it was not clearly established that firing six shots from his
rifle violated constitutional limits, Mullenix would pull the trigger
even though to do so contradicted his training, departmental policies, orders from his superior, and contemporaneous actions of the
other officers on the scene.339
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.

See
See
See
See
See

supra
supra
supra
supra
supra

text
text
text
text
text

accompanying
accompanying
accompanying
accompanying
accompanying

note 42.
note 61.
notes 84–86.
notes 134–35.
notes 199–205.
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The Court’s view of the workings of the mind are not only betrayed by its earlier formulation of the test for qualified immunity
but are refuted by its allowing government actors to successfully
invoke immunity even where the right is found to be clearly established. Although the right violated was clearly established, the official remains immune if either: a) they did not know and should not
have known of the right; or b) they did not know and should not
have known that their conduct violated the right.340 Consistent with
current neuroscience, the Court implicitly recognized that the official’s brain could and would arrive at a belief that the proposed
exercise of discretion was lawful by comparing the current situation
to patterns formed by all variables presented in similar experiences
that created the neural pathways of the brain. In deciding whether
the action is appropriate, the brain will not solely search for resemblance to cases about the constitutional right but also will consider
similarities from state constitutions, state statutes, state administrative regulations, policies, training, orders from superiors, and the
official’s previous encounters with the citizenry.
F. Reforming the Court’s Objective Immunity Standard to Be
Congruent with the Neuroscience of Governmental
Decision-Making
Beyond restoring the requirement that an official act in good
faith to be immune,341 there are at least three alternative modifications to the objective standard that would make the test for immunity congruent with how the brain of the government agent arrives
at the belief that they should act on the proposed exercise of
discretion.
First, those empowered to change the current test—the United
States Supreme Court, Congress, and state legislators and state
court judges enforcing rights guaranteed by the state constitution or
a state statute342—could return to the standard the Supreme Court
adopted in Scheuer v. Rhodes.343 That test acknowledged that the
official should and would draw upon all the experiences and inputs
that have shaped the neural architecture of their brain to reach a
single prediction that signaled the body to respond. Immunity
would be appropriate only if “in light of all the circumstances”
340. See supra text accompanying note 101–02.
341. See supra text accompanying note 81.
342. Local governments also may have occasion to define qualified immunity
for causes of action to enforce rights they legislate. See supra note 4.
343. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
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there were “reasonable grounds for the belief formed at the time”
that the intended action would be appropriate and lawful.344
The Scheuer test, however, does not satisfactorily account for
the true interaction between the official’s belief and conduct for all
constitutional guarantees. While some constitutional rights are defined by a purely legal test,345 other rights are violated only when
the official acts with a degree of culpability lying somewhere on the
tort spectrum—negligently,346 recklessly,347 with deliberate indifference,348 or in a manner that shocks the conscience.349 For these latter rights, the Scheuer test envisions that a state of affairs could
exist where, considering all the circumstances, it would be reasonable for the official to believe that their intended action was constitutional but unreasonable (or objectively worse) to act on that same
belief.
When applied to rights defined by tort-like culpability, the
Scheuer test recognizes the possibility that the brain would rely on a
different set of inputs in deciding to act than in forming a belief.
Allowing immunity for conduct that is objectively unreasonable envisages the brain issuing competing commands—the first, based on
inputs predictive of legality ordering “go,” and a second signal, after considering all the circumstances, including legality, shouting
“stop.” We now know, however, that this is not how the brain
works. If System 1 finds a sufficient resemblance to experience to
reach the prediction that the official should not act, System 2 will
not override that conclusion by conducting a deliberative assessment of data interpreting the federal constitution. Rather, to avoid
useless expenditure of glucose better allocated to necessary functions, System 2 will remain dormant, endorsing the prediction that
satisfied System 1. Therefore, a second option for reforming immu344. Id. at 247.
345. For example, most First Amendment doctrine erects legal tests defining
the degree of justification the government must meet to sustain a burden on
speech, see, e.g., Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 171 (2015) (permitting
content-based restrictions on speech only where the government can prove a compelling interest and that the regulation is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest); religion, see, e.g., Emp. Div., Dep’t of Hum. Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990) (subjecting neutral laws of general applicability that burden religion to rational basis review rather than strict scrutiny); and association, see, e.g., Roberts v.
U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984) (justifying a limitation on right to associate
for expressive purposes only where the restriction serves “compelling state interests, unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that cannot be achieved through means
significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms”).
346. See supra note 299 and accompanying text.
347. Supra note 300 and accompanying text.
348. Supra note 301 and accompanying text.
349. See supra note 302 and accompanying text.
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nity would be to import the Scheuer test for constitutional rights
governed by a legal standard but to deny immunity whenever plaintiff must prove objective negligence, recklessness, deliberate indifference, or conscience shocking conduct to establish a
constitutional violation.350
A third option is to eliminate qualified immunity as a defense
that exonerates an official from paying damages caused by their unconstitutional actions. After every input into belief-formation is
considered—unless they all point to the same conclusion—it will be
difficult for a judge or jury to reliably determine whether it was
reasonable for the official to believe it was lawful to act. The lower
courts’ continued struggle over the narrower inquiry of when a particular federal constitutional right is clearly established offers a canary-in-a-coal-mine warning as to how daunting and unpredictable
it will be if courts or jurors undertake to adjudge reasonableness of
belief under the multiple legal and experiential variables bearing on
that question.
Nor is rejection of the qualified immunity defense necessarily
problematic as a matter of policy. Immunity was designed to provide leeway for the official to act in the interests of the community.
But, in defining the contours of a constitutional right, courts have
struck a balance between the interest in individual autonomy free
from governmental incursion and the need and desirability of governmental action to protect the interests of that collective. In arriving at that balance, the courts have already baked in leeway for the
inevitable fact that officials will make mistakes.351 Thus one could
rightfully conclude that the Constitution itself has addressed the
very concerns that animated the doctrine of qualified immunity.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s qualified immunity jurisprudence is the
product of the inner workings of the Justices’ own brains, wired by
350. In the interest of full disclosure, I offered this same proposal over 40
years ago, before the findings of neuroscience on which this article is premised.
Gary S. Gildin, The Standard of Culpability in Section 1983 and Bivens Actions:
The Prima Facie Case, Qualified Immunity and the Constitution, 11 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 557 (1983).
351. See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949) (“Because many
situations which confront officers in the course of executing their duties are more
or less ambiguous, room must be allowed for some mistakes on their part. But the
mistakes must be those of reasonable men . . . .”). But see Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S.
194 (2001) (reasoning that qualified immunity affords additional leeway for mistakes in use of force beyond the room for error afforded by Fourth Amendment’s
objective reasonableness standard).
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their unique experiences. One can only speculate how—both
before and after becoming judges—the Justices’ personal experiences have created neural patterns that subconsciously predict government agents are unduly inhibited in the performance of their
duties by the specter of civil liability.352 The policy reformulation
they legislated is an offshoot of the operation of their minds, projecting the Court’s expertise in System 2 slow thinking as the default mode of how all government actors think and decide.
Whatever the ultimate resolution, those charged with shaping qualified immunity must take into account the findings of neuroscience
as to how the brain works if they opt to shield governments from
accountability for depriving citizens of their constitutional rights.353

352. Two prime candidates are a) the perception that Section 1983 actions
constitute an unwarranted percentage of cases on federal court dockets, and b) the
view that an expansive interpretation of Section 1983 results in federal courts unduly impinging on the province of the states to regulate their officials. See Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 611 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting). The repeated
willingness of the Court to suspend normal doctrines of judicial self-limitation to
limit the scope of Section 1983 is suggestive of a subconscious or conscious agenda.
See generally Gary S. Gildin, The Supreme Court’s Legislative Agenda to Free Government from Accountability for Constitutional Deprivations, 114 PENN STATE L.
REV. 1333 (2010).
353. It should go without saying that any reform also should consider adjusting current doctrine on entity liability that leaves the victim without a remedy
where the individual official is immunized. See supra text accompanying notes
28–29.

